Mike Gerwitz

Activist for User Freedom

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#+startup: beamer
#+TITLE: The Surreptitious Assault on Privacy, Security, and Freedom
#+AUTHOR: Mike Gerwitz
#+EMAIL: mtg@gnu.org
#+DATE: 26 March, LibrePlanet 2017
#+OPTIONS: H:3 num:nil toc:nil p:nil todo:nil stat:nil
#+LaTeX_CLASS: beamer
#+LaTeX_CLASS_OPTIONS: [presentation]
#+BEAMER_THEME: Warsaw
#+BEAMER_HEADER: \beamertemplatenavigationsymbolsempty
#+BIBLIOGRAPHY: sapsf plain
#+TODO: RAW(r) DEVOID(v) LACKING(l) DRAFT(d) REVIEWED(R) | READY(+) REHEARSED(D)
#+COLUMNS: %40ITEM %10DURATION{:} %TODO %BEAMER_ENV(ENVIRONMENT)


#+BEGIN: columnview :hlines 3 :id global
| ITEM                                          | DURATION | TODO    | ENVIRONMENT   |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| * LaTeX Configuration                         |          |         |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| * Slides                                      |     0:44 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Introduction / Opening                     | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Mobile [0/5]                               |     0:04 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Introduction                              |     0:00 | DRAFT   | ignoreheading |
| **** Introduction                             | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Cell Towers [0/2]                         |    00:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Fundamentally Needed                     |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Cell-Site Simulators                     |          | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Wifi [0/3]                                |    00:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Wifi                                     |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Ubiquitous Access Points                 |          | DEVOID  |               |
| **** Mitigations                              |          | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Location Services [0/2]                   |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** GPS                                      |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Access Points                            |          | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Operating System [0/3]                    |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Untrusted/Proprietary OS                 |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Free/Libre Mobile OS?                    |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Modem                                    |          | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Stationary [0/5]                           |     0:08 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Introduction [0/1]                        |     0:00 | DRAFT   | ignoreheading |
| **** Introduction                             | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Surveillance Cameras [0/2]                |     0:00 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Unavoidable Surveillance                 |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Access to Data                           | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Internet of Things [0/4]                  |     0:04 | LACKING |               |
| **** Internet-Connected Cameras               | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** The ``S'' In IoT Stands For ``Security'' | 00:01:30 | LACKING |               |
| **** Who's Watching?                          | 00:00:30 | DEVOID  |               |
| **** Facial Recognition                       |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Social Media [0/1]                        |     0:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Collateral Damage                        |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Driving [0/3]                             |     0:02 | RAW     |               |
| **** Introduction                             | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** ALPRs                                    |    00:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Car Itself                               | 00:00:30 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** The Web [0/6]                              |     0:10 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Introduction [0/1]                        |          | DRAFT   | ignoreheading |
| **** Introduction                             |          | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Bridging the Gap [0/1]                    |     0:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Ultrasound Tracking                      |    00:01 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Incentive to Betray [0/1]                 |     0:00 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Summary                                  | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Analytics [0/2]                           |     0:02 | LACKING |               |
| **** Trackers                                 |    00:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Like Buttons                             |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Fingerprinting [0/3]                      |     0:03 | LACKING |               |
| **** Summary                                  |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Alarmingly Effective                     |    00:03 | LACKING | fullframe     |
| **** User Agent                               |          | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Anonymity [0/4]                           |     0:04 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Summary                                  |    00:01 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| ***** Anonymity                               |          |         |               |
| ***** Pseudonymity                            |          |         |               |
| **** IANAAE                                   |          | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** The Tor Network                          |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix            |    00:02 | DRAFT   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Data Analytics [0/2]                       |     0:04 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Introduction [0/1]                        |     0:00 | DRAFT   | ignoreheading |
| **** Introduction                             |    00:00 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Headings [0/3]                            |     0:04 | LACKING |               |
| **** Advertisers                              |    00:02 | LACKING |               |
| **** Social Media                             |    00:01 | DEVOID  |               |
| **** Governments                              | 00:00:30 | DEVOID  |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Policy and Government [0/6]                |     0:12 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Introduction [0/1]                        |     0:00 | DRAFT   | ignoreheading |
| **** Introduction                             | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Surveillance [0/7]                        |     0:06 | LACKING |               |
| **** History of NSA Surveillance              |    00:02 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Ron Wyden                                |          | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** The Leak                                 |          | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** Verizon Metadata                         | 00:00:30 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** PRISM                                    |          | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Snowden                                  |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Tools                                    |    00:02 | DEVOID  |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Crypto Wars [0/6]                         |     0:04 | LACKING |               |
| **** Introduction                             |    00:00 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** Export-Grade Crypto                      | 00:01:30 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Bernstein v. United States               |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** The First Crypto Wars                    |    00:01 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Re-repeats Itself                        |    00:00 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** Modern Crypto Wars                       |          | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** ``Going Dark''                           |          | DEVOID  |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Espionage [0/1]                           |     0:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets            |    00:01 | DEVOID  |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Subpoenas, Warrants, NSLs [0/1]           |     0:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** National Security Letters                |    00:01 | DEVOID  |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Law [0/1]                                 |     0:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Summary                                  |    00:01 | DEVOID  | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Your Fight [0/1]                           |     0:05 | LACKING |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| *** Headings [0/6]                            |     0:05 | LACKING |               |
| **** Feeding                                  |    00:00 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** SaaSS and Centralization                 |    00:01 | DEVOID  |               |
| **** Corporate Negligence                     |    00:01 | LACKING |               |
| **** Status Quo                               |    00:02 | DRAFT   |               |
| **** Status Quo Cannot Hold                   |          | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
| **** Push Back                                |    00:01 | DRAFT   | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** Thank You                                  |          |         | fullframe     |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| ** References                                 |          |         | appendix      |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| * Exporting                                   |          |         |               |
|-----------------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------------|
| * Local Variables                             |          |         |               |
#+END


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
*Remember the themes!*:
  - Surreptitious
  - User privacy and security
  - Affects on freedom; chilling effects
  - How free software can help

The big players seem to be the [[The Web][Web]] and [[Policy and Government][Government]].
No surprises there.


It would be a good idea to immediately connect with the audience.  So:
  - Most everyone has a mobile device.
    - /This is the most immediate and relatable since it's physically present/
      with them in their travels.
  - Security cameras et. al. during travel.

So start _briefly_ with the topic of pervasive surveillance?
  - That is what the abstract refers to, after all.

*Surreptitious*---many audience members won't consider that they're being
tracked.
  - But by _whom_?

Maybe a gentle introduction that gets increasingly more alarming and
invasive topic-wise.

GOAL: Captivate; Startle
#+END_COMMENT


* LaTeX Configuration                                         :export:ignore:
#+LATEX_HEADER: \usepackage{color}
#+BEGIN_LATEX
% citations will be grayed and pushed to the right margin
\let\origcite\cite
% incite = "inline" cite
\def\cite{\hfill\incite}
\newcommand*{\incite}[1]{{%
  \scriptsize
  \raisebox{1ex}{%
    \color{gray}%
    \origcite{#1}%
  }%
}}
#+END_LATEX


* LACKING Slides                                              :export:ignore:
** DRAFT Introduction / Opening                                :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
None of you made it here without being tracked in some capacity.
Some of us are still being tracked at this very moment.

...

Let's start with the obvious.

(Note: You're being "tracked", rather than "watched": the latter is too
often used and dismissed as tinfoil-hat FUD.)
#+END_COMMENT

#+BEGIN_CENTER
  #+BEAMER: \only<1>{You're Being Tracked.}
  #+BEAMER: \only<2>{(No, really, I have references.)}
#+END_CENTER

** LACKING Mobile [0/5]
*** DRAFT Introduction                                    :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- <1-> Most people carry mobile phones
- <1-> Synonymous with individual
- <2> Excellent tracking devices

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
How many of you are carrying a mobile phone right now?
Probably most of us.
They are something we carry with us everywhere;
  they are computers that are always on.
A phone is often synonymous with an individual.
In other words: they're excellent tracking devices.
#+END_COMMENT

*** LACKING Cell Towers [0/2]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:
**** DRAFT Fundamentally Needed
- <1-> Phone needs tower to make and receive calls
- <2-> Gives away approximate location (can triangulate)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The primary reason is inherent in a phone's design: cell towers.
A phone "needs" to be connected to a tower to make and receive calls.

Unless it is off,
  its connection to the cell tower exposes your approximate location.
These data persist for as long as the phone companies are willing to persist
it.  If it's mined by the NSA, then it might be persisted indefinitely.

Some people don't use phones primarily for this reason.

rms said he might use a phone if it could act as a pager,
  where he'd only need to expose his location once he is in a safe place.
You can imagine that such would be a very useful and important feature for
  reporters and dissidents as well.
#+END_COMMENT


**** LACKING Cell-Site Simulators
- <1-> Masquerade as cell towers
- <2-> (List them) e.g. Stingray

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
I'm sure many of you have heard of Cell Site Simulators;
  one of the most popular examples being the Stingray.
These devices masquerade as cell towers and can perform a dragnet search for
  an individual.
Your location can be triangulated.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Wifi [0/3]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

**** DRAFT Wifi
- Device may broadcast ESSIDs of past hidden networks
- Expose unique hardware identifiers (MAC address)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
What else is inherent in a modern phone design?
A common feature is Wifi.

If you connected to any hidden networks,
  your phone may broadcast that network name to see if it exists.

Your mobile device could be broadcasting information like past network
  connections and unique device identifiers (MAC),
  which can be used to uniquely identify you.
#+END_COMMENT

**** DEVOID Ubiquitous Access Points
- <AP stuff>

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Access points increasingly line the streets or are within range in nearby
  buildings.

Can be incredibly accurate for tracking movements,
  and it is _passive_---it requires no software on your device.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Mitigations
- Disable Wifi [when not in use]
- Do not automatically connect to known networks
  - At the very least, not hidden
- Randomize MAC address

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Disable Wifi when not in use.
You can also randomize your MAC address,
  and be sure not to broadcast hidden networks.
#+END_COMMENT


*** DRAFT Location Services [0/2]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

**** DRAFT GPS
- Often enabled by default
  - Might prompt user, but features are attractive

- Programs give excuses to track
  - Location for tweets, photos, nearby friends, etc.

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Oh, but what if we _do_ have software on the device?
And we do.

Let's talk about location services!
Many people find them to be very convenient.

The most popular being GPS.
Because of the cool features it permits,
  it's often enabled.
And programs will track your movements just for the hell of it.
Or give an excuse to track you.
#+END_COMMENT

**** DRAFT Access Points
- <1-> No GPS?  No problem!
- <2-> AP harvesting (e.g. Google Street View cars)
- <2-> Works even where GPS and Cell signals cannot penetrate
  - <3> Can be /more/ accurate than GPS (e.g. what store in a shopping mall)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But GPS doesn't need to be available.
Have you ever used a map program on a computer that asked for your location?
How does it do that without GPS?
Google scours the planet recording APs.
It knows based on _what APs are simply near you_ where you are.
Sometimes this can be more accurate than GPS.
And it works where GPS and maybe even cell service don't, such as inside
  shopping malls.

So having radio and GPS off may not help you.
MAC spoofing won't help since software on your device has countless other
  ways to uniquely identify you---this is active monitoring, unlike previous
  examples.
#+END_COMMENT

*** DRAFT Operating System [0/3]
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

**** DRAFT Untrusted/Proprietary OS

- Who does your phone work for?
  - Apple?  Google?  Microsoft?  Blackberry?  Your manufacturer too?
- Carry everywhere you go, but fundamentally cannot trust it

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The OS situation on mobile is lousy.
Does your phone work for Apple? Google? Microsoft? Blackberry? ...?

You carry around this computer everywhere you go.
And you fundamentally cannot trust it.
#+END_COMMENT

**** DRAFT Free/Libre Mobile OS?
- <1-3> Android is supposedly free software
  - <1-3> But every phone requires proprietary drivers, or contains
         proprietary software
- <2-3> Replicant
  - <3> Niche.  Interest is low, largely work of one developer now.

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
I use Replicant.
Does anyone here use Replicant?
I feel like I can at least trust my phone a little bit.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Modem
- But modem still runs non-free software
- Often has access to CPU, disk, and memory

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But on nearly every phone,
  the modem still runs proprietary software.
And often times has direct access to CPU, disk, and memory.

So even with Replicant,
  I consider the device compromised;
    I put nothing important on it if I can avoid it.
#+END_COMMENT



** LACKING Stationary [0/5]
*** DRAFT Introduction [0/1]                              :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
Certain types of tracking are unavoidable.
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So let's say you have evaded that type of tracking.
Maybe you don't carry a phone.
Or maybe you've mitigated those threats in some way.

There's certain things that are nearly impossible to avoid.
#+END_COMMENT

*** DRAFT Surveillance Cameras [0/2]
**** DRAFT Unavoidable Surveillance

- Security cameras are everywhere
  - Homes
  - Private businesses
  - Traffic cameras
  - Streets
  - ...

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
On the way here,
  you likely walked by numerous security cameras.
They could be security cameras for private businesses.
Traffic cameras.
Cameras on streets to deter crime.

Let's set aside local, state, and federal-owned cameras for a moment
  and focus on businesses.
So a bunch of separate businesses have you on camera.
So what?
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Access to Data
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- <1> Data can be subpoenaed or obtained with a warrant
- <1> If law enforcement wants to track you, they can
- <2> If you own a surveillance system, be responsible and considerate
  - <2> Best way to restrict data is to avoid collecting it to begin with

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Well one of the most obvious threats, should it pertain to you, is a
  subpoena.
If law enforcement wanted to track you for whatever reason---crime or
  not!---they could simply subpoena the surrounding area.
The best form of privacy is to avoid having the data be collected to begin
  with.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Internet of Things [0/4]
**** DRAFT Internet-Connected Cameras
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- Cameras used to be ``closed-circuit''
- Today\ldots not always so much

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
In the past, these cameras were "closed-circuit"---
  they were on their own segregated network.
You'd _have_ to subpoena the owner,
  or otherwise physically take the tape.

Today, that might be the intent, but these cameras are often
  connected to the Internet for one reason or another.
It might be intentional---to view the camera remotely---or it may just be
  how it is set up by default.

Well...
Let's expand our pool of cameras a bit.
Because it's not just businesses that use Internet-connected cameras.
They're also popular among individuals for personal/home use.
Home security systems.
Baby monitors.
#+END_COMMENT

**** LACKING The ``S'' In IoT Stands For ``Security''
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01:30
:END:

- Shodan---IoT search engine
- Mirai
- ...<other concerns>

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Who here has heard of Shodan?

Shodan is a search engine for the Internet of Things.
It spiders for Internet-connected devices and indexes them.
Okay, that's to be expected.
Maybe that wouldn't be a problem if people knew proper NAT configuration
  that isn't subverted by UPnP.
Maybe it wouldn't be a problem if these devices even gave a moment of
  thought to security.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID Who's Watching?
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- Insecam
  - <Add information>

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Anyone heard of Insecam?
It's a site that aggregates live video feeds of unsecured IP cameras.
I can tell you personally that you feel like a scumbag looking at the site.
There's fascinating things on there.
And sobering ones.
And creepy ones.
Restaurants---families eating dinner; chefs preparing food in the back.
Public areas---beaches, pools, walkways, city streets.
Private areas---inside homes; private businesses.  Hotel clerks sitting
  behind desks on their cell phones.  Warehouses.
Behind security desks.
Behind cash registers.
Hospital rooms.
Inside surveillance rooms where people watch their surveillance system!
  With armed guards!
Scientific research: people in full dress performing experiments.
I saw someone at the dentist getting a teeth cleaning.
Anything you can think of.
You can literally explore the world.
There are some beautiful sights!  Absolutely gorgeous.
They remove things that are too deeply personal.
  Assuming someone reports it.

This is an excellent example to demonstrate to others why this is such a big
  deal.

So that's what your average person can do.
That's what some of you are going to be doing as soon as you leave this
  talk, if you haven't started looking already!

That's what law enforcement is going to do.
That's what the NSA, GHCQ, et. al. are going to do.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Facial Recognition
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> Humans no longer need to scour video feeds
- <2-> Facial recognition widely used even for entertainment
- <3-> No face?  Check your gait.

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Now let's couple that with facial recognition.

Consider the breadth of devices we just covered.
Literally everywhere.
People don't need to manually look for you anymore;
  it's automated.
Hell, any of us can download a free (as in freedom) library to do facial
  recognition and train it to recognize people.
Facebook famously got creepy by saying it could recognize people by their
  dress and posture, from behind.

You don't need facial recognition, though.
You can also be identified by your gait.

There's a lot to say about IoT.
We'll come back to it.
#+END_COMMENT


*** DRAFT Social Media [0/1]
**** DRAFT Collateral Damage
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> Don't put pictures of me on Facebook
- <1-> Don't put pictures of my children _anywhere_
- <2-> That person in the distance that happens to be in your photo has
  been inflicted with collateral damage

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So you don't have any unsecured IoT cameras in your home.
Or in this conference.
But you do have unsecured people running wild with their photos and their
  selfies.

I'm sure you've heard a frequent request/demand from rms:
"Don't put pictures of me on Facebook."
This applies to all social media, really.
I just mentioned facial recognition---
  this is precisely what Facebook (for example) made it for!
To identify people you might know to tag them.
It's excellent surveillance.
What irks me is when people try to take pictures of my kids,
  or do and ask if they can put them online.
Uh, no.  You cannot.
And people are sometimes surprised by that refusal.

Most people are being innocent---
  they're just trying to capture the moment.
What they're actually doing is inflicting collateral damage.
If I'm off in the background when you take a picture of your friends in the
  foreground,
  I'm still in the photo.
#+END_COMMENT


*** RAW Driving [0/3]
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- Do you drive a vehicle?


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Okay.
So you have no phone.
You sneak around public areas like a ninja.
Like a vampire, you don't show up in photos.
And you have no friends.

So how else can I physically track you in your travels here?

Well if you flew here,
  then your location is obviously known.
That's not even worth discussing.

But what about if you drove?
#+END_COMMENT


**** LACKING ALPRs
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
ALPRs possibly tracked your movements.
Automated License Plate Readers.

<...>

Maybe you try to evade them with special license plate covers.
If need be, one could just track you by other unique features of your
  vehicle.
And those might not just be law enforcement.

Security issues extend to this too!
<Mention EFF's project>

You could rent a car.
But the rental place probably took your name, license, and other
  information.
You could take a cab and pay with cash.
But that can get expensive.
And they might have cameras and such anyway.
#+END_COMMENT


**** LACKING Car Itself
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- Your vehicle itself might be a spy

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Maybe your car itself is a tracking device (e.g. OnStar).

(Move into Mobile?)

<...>
#+END_COMMENT


** LACKING The Web [0/6]
*** DRAFT Introduction [0/1]                              :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- Much of our lives are no longer in the flesh
- Or have some non-fleshy (virtual) analog

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But you're not just tracked in the flesh.
Much of what we do today is virtual.
What better way to segue than to bridge the two?
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Bridging the Gap [0/1]
**** LACKING Ultrasound Tracking
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> How do you bridge that analog?
- <2-> Particularly insidious example: ultrasound tracking
  - <2-> Correlates users across devices

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
A challenge for advertisers is correlating users across multiple devices,
and in the real world.

Let's say you saw a commercial for some product Foo on TV.
And then you went online to research Foo.
And then you bought Foo.

Sometimes commercials have you enter promo codes online to know that you
  arrived at the site from a TV commercial.
Or give you a unique URL.

Others play inaudible sounds that are picked up by your mobile device or
  computer.

<...>
#+END_COMMENT


*** DRAFT Incentive to Betray [0/1]
**** DRAFT Summary                                           :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
There is strong incentive to betray
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
So how does tracking happen?
How does this tracking code _get_ on so much of the web?

Incentives to betray users.

Many websites make money through advertising.
It can be lucrative.
And it's _easy_ to do.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Analytics [0/2]
**** LACKING Trackers
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing
  - <1-> That in itself isn't an unreasonable concept
- <2-> Methods and data define the issue

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Site analytics is another issue.
Website owners want to know what their visitors are doing.
That in itself isn't an unreasonable thing broadly speaking,
  but how you go about it and what types of data you collect
  defines the issue.

Take Google Analytics for example.
A very popular proprietary analytics service.
It is one of the most widely distributed malware programs in the world.

<<examples of how GA tracks>>

And all of this is known to Google.
All of this can be used to identify users across the entire web.

<<list others>>

If you must track your users, consider using Piwik, which you can host
  yourself.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Like Buttons
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> Services encourage use of "like" buttons and such
- <1-> Infecting the web with trackers under the guise of community
- <2-> **Use Privacy Badger**

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Another popular example are "like buttons" and similar little widgets that
  websites like Facebook offer.
If a user is logged into Facebook,
  then Facebook now knows that they visited that website,
  _even if they don't click on the button_.

But even if you don't have a Facebook account,
  information is being leaked to them
  you are still being tracked.

Addons like Privacy Badger will block these.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Fingerprinting [0/3]
**** DRAFT Summary                                           :B_fullframe:
#+BEGIN_CENTER
  Browser Fingerprinting
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
These methods are part of a broader topic called "browser fingerprinting".
It's just what it sounds like:
  uniquely identify users online.
#+END_COMMENT


**** LACKING Alarmingly Effective
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:03
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- Panopticlick (EFF)\cite{panopti:about}
- JavaScript opens up a world of possibilities
- Clearing cookies et al. won't always help
- Can even track separate browsers on the same box

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
It's alarmingly effective.

Some methods allow fingerprinting even if the user uses multiple browsers
  and takes care to clear all session data.
They can do this by effectively breaking out of the browser's sandbox by
  doing operations that depend heavily on specifics of users' hardware.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT User Agent
- <1-> User agents can leak a lot of information
  - <1-> ~18 bits in my browser on GNU/Linux, 1/~250,000
- <2-> Tor Browser\cite{panopti:about}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Your browser's user agent is a string that it sends with every request
  identifying itself and some of its capabilities.
It can be surprisingly unique.
When I tested a Firefox browser on GNU/Linux,
  I was unique out of nearly 250,000 users.
#+END_COMMENT


*** DRAFT Anonymity [0/4]
**** DRAFT Summary                                           :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Another way is to be anonymous or pseudononymous.
In the latter case,
  you assume a pseudoynm online and perform only activities that should be
  associated with that pseudonym.
In the former case,
  there should be no way to ever correlate past or future actions with your
  current session.
#+END_COMMENT

***** Anonymity
Origin is unknown to server; no unique identifier known by
server\incite{whonix:donot}

***** Pseudonymity
Origin is unknown to server; unique identifier /is available/ to
server\incite{whonix:donot}


**** DRAFT IANAAE                                            :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
  IANAAE (I Am Not An Anonymity Expert)
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
This is a difficult topic that's pretty dangerous to give advice on if you
  have strong need for anonymity---for example, if you are a dissident or
  whistleblower.
If your life depends on anonymity,
  please do your own research.
I provide a number of resources to get you started.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT The Tor Network
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- The Onion Router (Tor)\cite{tor}
- Helps defend against traffic analysis
- (Routing image)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Most here have probably heard of Tor.
"Tor" stands for "The Onion Router",
  which describes how it relays data through the Tor network.

The packet is routed through a number of servers,
  encrypted with the public key of each server such that the first hop
  strips off the first layer and so on.
The exit node reveals the packet and delivers it to the destination,
  then begins relaying the reply back to through the network to the user.

As long as a sufficient portion of the network can be trusted and has not
  been compromised by an adversary,
  it isn't possible to trace data back through the network.

The most common use of Tor is to route web traffic.
Many nodes block most other ports.
It's also possible to resolve DNS requests through Tor.

There are lots of other details that I don't have time to get to here,
  but I provide a number of resources for you.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT TorBrowser, Tails, and Whonix
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

- <1-> Tor alone isn't enough
- <1-> Browser needs to be hardened
  - <2-> TorBrowser is a hardened Firefox derivative
- <1-> Operating System needs to be hardened
  - <2-> Tails, Whonix

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Tor alone isn't enough to secure your anonymity.

It's hard to secure a web browser.

TorBrowser is a hardened version of Firefox.
The Tor browser recommends that you don't rely on a vanilla Firefox for
  anonymity with Tor.

Tails...

Whonix...
#+END_COMMENT


** LACKING Data Analytics [0/2]
*** DRAFT Introduction [0/1]                              :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
``Big Data''

(/Your/ Big Data)
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
We've seen adversaries with different motives.
Let's explore what some of them do with all those data.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Headings [0/3]
**** LACKING Advertisers
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

- Most users' threat models don't include the NSA
- Biggest threat to privacy are companies that aggregate data to understand
  you (often /better than you/)

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
The biggest threat to privacy to the average user is by companies that
  aggregate data for the purpose of understanding _you_.
Probably better than you understand you.
I'm sure many of you heard of the story of Target knowing a girl was
  pregnant before she did.

<<user profiles>>
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID Social Media
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
(Where you are, what you do.)
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID Governments
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
(Segue into government surveillance.)
#+END_COMMENT


** LACKING Policy and Government [0/6]
*** DRAFT Introduction [0/1]                              :B_ignoreheading:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: ignoreheading
:END:
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

- <1-> Governments have a duty to protect their people
- <2-> Governments have a duty to protect citizens' rights

#+BEGIN_LATEX
\vspace{2ex}
\only<3>{
  \begin{center}
    These duties are often at odds
  \end{center}
}
#+END_LATEX

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Where to begin.

Governments have a duty to protect their people.
But they also have a duty to know their bounds;
  to protect citizens' rights and privacy.

We know how that story goes.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Surveillance [0/7]
**** DRAFT History of NSA Surveillance
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

- <1-> EFF has been fighting NSA domestic spying
       since 2005\cite{eff:nsa:timeline,mtg:uproar}
- <1-> AT&T technician Mark Klein
- <1-> Dragnet surveillance; NSA-controlled ``SG3 Secure Room''
- <2-> Hepting v. AT&T (2006)
  - <2-> Government and AT&T retroactive immunity through FAA (2008)
- <2-> Jewel v. NSA (2008)
  - <2-> Summary of Voluminous Evidence

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
When we think of the term ``surveillance'',
  the NSA usually comes to mind.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been fighting the NSA
  in court since 2006.
In 2005, a former AT&T technician Mark Klein provided ``undisputed
  evidence'' about an NSA-controlled room at AT&T named ``SG-3'', through
  which all traffic passed.

The EFF filed Hepting v. AT&T in 2006.
But in 2008, both the government and AT&T were awarded retroactive immunity
  through the FISA Amendments Act.
The case was dismissed in 2009, along with dozens of other lawsuits.

In response,
  the EFF filed Jewel v. NSA.
The case also benefitted from three additional whistleblowers.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Ron Wyden                                            :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

Senator Ron Wyden, 26 May 2011:

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
I have served on the Intelligence Committee for over a decade and I wish to
deliver a warning this afternoon. When the American people find out how
their government has secretly interpreted [the business records provision of
FISA], they are going to be stunned and they are going to be angry.
#+END_QUOTE


**** DRAFT The Leak                                          :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
5 June 2013
#+END_CENTER


**** DRAFT Verizon Metadata
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00:30
:END:

- <1-> 5 June 2013---Guardian releases leaked document ordering Verizon to
  collect ``telephony metadata''

#+BEGIN_QUOTE
  [...] (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
  United States, including local telephone calls.
#+END_QUOTE

- <2-> ``Business records'' provision partly declassified by Clapper on 6 June 2013

- <2-> The American people were stunned and angry
  - <2-> But it wasn't a surprise to many

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
June 5th 2013.
I remember where I was.
Does anyone remember what that date represents?

The Guardian newspaper releases a leaked court order,
  which orders Verizon to collect ``telephony metadata'' on /all/ calls,
  /including local/.

That ``business records'' provision of FISA that Ron Wyden was talking about
  was partly declassified by the then-DNI James Clapper on June 6th, 2013.

As Wyden predicted,
  we were pretty stunned.
And pretty pissed off.

But it wasn't a surprise to many security researchers.
You guys can take a look at the references for more information on that.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT PRISM
- 6 June 2013---Guardian leaks slideshow describing PRISM

- All companies denied involvement

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But it didn't end there!
Well, obviously, we know that now.

One day later,
  the Guardian releases a leaked slideshow that describes PRISM.

All companies eventually denied involvement in this program.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Snowden
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- 9 June 2013---The Guardian reveals Edward Snowden as the whistleblower

- Smear campaign


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
These were serious leaks.
They still are.
And three days later---to our surprise---the source of the leaks was
  revealed.

And the world came to know Edward Snowden through a huge smear campaign.
They pointed out that his girlfriend was a pole dancer.
They tried to discredit his role at the agency.
They tried to paint him as this social loner, and downplay his skills.

Fortunately, that conversation didn't last long, and did not succeed.
I'm not sure how many of you were here last year,
  but Snowden gave the opening keynote to LP2016.
He received a minute-long standing ovation.
The energy in that room was incredible.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID Tools
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- XKeyscore and others
- Exploits
- Hardware
- Intercepting shipments
- Etc.
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Crypto Wars [0/6]
**** DRAFT Introduction                                      :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge History repeats itself
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
All of that happened behind our backs.

But there is also a war being waged in public.
As if we haven't learned from the past.
The Crypto wars.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Export-Grade Crypto
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01:30
:END:

- <1-> Cryptography classified as munitions (Arms Export Control Act; ITAR)
- <1-> ``Export-grade'' cryptography
- <2-> Lotus Notes
  - <2-> 40-bit export-grade symmetric key
  - <3-> Agreement with NSA: 64-bit export, but 24 of those bits a "workload
    reduction factor" for the NSA
- <4-> Phil Zimmerman: PGP (\geq 128 bits)
  - <4-> Formal investigation by US government in 1993
  - <4-> Published source code in a book, which could be OCR'd
- <5-> Still suffer long-term effects today
       (downgrade attacks, e.g. POODLE)\cite{poodle:paper}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Back in the 1990s,
  cryptography was classified as munitions.

If you wanted to export it to other countries,
  you essentially had to make it crackable by the NSA.

Lotus Notes is often used as an example of the negative effects of such
  regulation.
Interestingly, it was actually the first widely used software to use
  public-key cryptography.
Due to export restrictions,
  the maximum symmetric key size they could support was 40 bits.
This was easily crackable by the NSA,
  but also feasible for other adversaries.
They compromised with the NSA:
  64-bit keys, but 24 of those bits would be encrypted specially for the NSA
  as a "workload reduction factor".
So you had protection against most adversaries,
  but not the US government.

Then we have Phil Zimmerman, author of PGP.
He didn't consult the NSA.
Instead, he published the source code for PGP in a book with MIT Press,
  and widely distributed it.
If someone wanted to use PGP,
  they could unbind the book, OCR the pages, and compile it with GCC.
The US government opened a formal investigation into the case in 1993;
  the charges were dropped years later.

We are still observing the fallout from export-grade crypto today.
They are called "downgrade attacks",
  where a program such as a browser is tricked into using a weaker
  cipher or keysize,
    allowing an attacker to MitM the connection.
POODLE is an example of this.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Bernstein v. United States
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:
- <1-> 1995: Bernstein v. US Department of Justice\cite{eff:bernstein:doj}
  - <1-> Argued that restrictions violated First Amendment
  - <2-> **Code Is Speech**
- <1-> 1996: Bill Clinton Executive Order 13026 transferred to Commerce
       Control List\cite{fedr:export-controls}
- <1-> Department of Commerce relaxed rules in 2000\cite{doc:rev-export-reg}

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
In order to publish information on encryption algorithms and the like,
  you had to get permission from the government.

In 1995, Daniel Bernstein---then a graduate student---wanted to publish the
  source code and mathematical papers for his encryption algorithm
  /Snuffle/.
Like Zimmerman,
  Bernstein thought export restrictions to be a violation of his First
  Amendment rights.
But instead of blatant defiance,
  he decided to sue the US government.
He was represented by the EFF.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in his favor.

The following year, President Bill Clinton signed an executive order that
  removed encryption from the munitions list,
    and in 2000 the Department of Commerce relaxed export restrictions.

You might have heard the term "code is speech".
Bernstein v. United States case had wide-reaching consequences,
  not just for cryptography.
Source code is protected under the First Amendment.

(See also Junger v. Daley.)
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT The First Crypto Wars
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- <1-> These incidents part of the first Crypto Wars\cite{w:crypto-wars}
- <2-> DES Originally 64-bit key; NSA wanted 48 bits; compromised at 56.
- <2-> Two version of the browser: 128-bit "U.S. edition" and effective
         40-bit "international".
- <3-> **Clipper Chip** was a hardware backdoor that employed a key escrow
       system
  - <3-> Complete failure
  - <3-> Terribly insecure (property of key escrow in general)
  - <3-> Opposite effect: spurred development of Nautilus and PGPfone

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
These incidents are classified into a period of time informally described as
  the "Crypo Wars".

There's a couple other good examples that I don't have time to get into:
  The DES encryption algorithm, for example, was originally 64-bit;
    the NSA wanted 48-bit, but compromised with 56.
  Netscape had /two versions of their browser/: one with 128-bit SSL and the
    other with 88 of those bits exposed to meet export regulations.
This sounds insane today---because it is.

But there's even more insanity.

The Clipper Chip!
It was the US government's attempt to backdoor communications with hardware.
It used a key escrow system,
  and the algorithm they devised---called Skipjack---was classified,
  and so could not be reviewed by crypto experts at the time.
Backlash was large.
It failed miserably.
Later cryptanalysis yielded scathing flaws,
  as is generally the case with key escrow cryptosystems.
It even had the opposite effect:
  it spurred the development of encrypted communication programs like
  Nautilus and PGPfone (the latter being proprietary).

So,
  why did I go into so much history in a talk meant to deal with today's
  privacy and security threats?
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Re-repeats Itself                                    :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge History repeats itself
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Because history repeats itself.

Today's attempted legal/policy assault on privacy and security are enormous.
We've already covered some.
I don't have time to cover more than a small fraction of them.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Modern Crypto Wars                                :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
\Huge ``Going Dark''
#+END_CENTER


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
But the big phrase you hear today is "going dark".
Government agencies are fearful of broadening use of encryption
  because they can't read many of those communications.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DEVOID ``Going Dark''

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Apple v. FBI
VEP
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Espionage [0/1]
**** DEVOID US Can't Keep Its Own Secrets
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Office of Personnel Management
- DNC
- VEP
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Subpoenas, Warrants, NSLs [0/1]
**** DEVOID National Security Letters
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Gag orders
- Prior restraint
- Canaries
#+END_COMMENT


*** LACKING Law [0/1]
**** DEVOID Summary                                          :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- DMCA
  - Risks to security researchers
  - Draconian
- CFAA
#+END_COMMENT


** LACKING Your Fight [0/1]
*** LACKING Headings [0/6]
**** DRAFT Feeding                                           :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:00
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
We're feeding into all of this!
#+END_CENTER


**** DEVOID SaaSS and Centralization
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

TODO

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Be sure to mention Cloudbleed and S3
- Who has access to your data?
- The "Cloud"
#+END_COMMENT


**** LACKING Corporate Negligence
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:END:

- Companies balance security and privacy on their balance sheets


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
Companies don't care.
They'll balance _costs_ of failure to comply with regulation.
Is it cheaper just to pay up in the event of a data breach?

Governments try, sort of.
They need to catch up with the times.
<<sec regulations>>

<<large-scale breaches>>

(Tie into SaaSS)
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Status Quo
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:02
:END:

- Do people care more about privacy and security since the Snowden leaks?
  - (Cite)
- ``I have nothing to hide''
- ``Report anything suspicious''
- Chilling effects


#+BEGIN_COMMENT
You would think after the Snowden revelations that people would be more
  privacy-centric.

Some are.
Many aren't.
There is complacency with the status quo.
Everything is so _convenient_.

"I have nothing to hide."
A common argument.
One that can be notoriously hard to address.

"Report anything suspicious."
(Example of mathematician on plane.)

These all have chilling effects, conscious or not.
<<Wikipedia articles>>
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Status Quo Cannot Hold                            :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
**The status quo cannot hold.**
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
I hope I've convinced you that the status quo cannot hold.
That even people who aren't that privacy- or security-conscious recognize
  that there are risks not only at a personal level,
  but also national and global.
#+END_COMMENT


**** DRAFT Push Back                                         :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:DURATION: 00:01
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIn_CENTER
#+BEAMER: \only<1>{We need to push back}
#+BEAMER: \only<2>{\emph{You} need to push back}
#+END_CENTER

#+BEGIN_COMMENT
- Good crypto; no trust
- Lawmakers: this is not something we can win while we fight with our
  governments.
#+END_COMMENT


** Thank You                                                   :B_fullframe:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: fullframe
:END:

#+BEGIN_CENTER
Mike Gerwitz

[[mailto:mtg@gnu.org][=mtg@gnu.org=]]

\bigskip

**References Available Online**

[[https://mikegerwitz.com/talks/sapsf]]

\vfill

Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0
International License
#+END_CENTER


** References                                                   :B_appendix:
:PROPERTIES:
:BEAMER_env: appendix
:END:

\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{sapsf}


* Exporting
You should be able to simply export this buffer as a Beamer presentation
(=C-c C-e l P=) and get a slideshow.

Note that this requires =ox-extras=, which is part of Org Mode's
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#                          ("DEVOID" . (:inherit org-warning \
#                                       :inverse-video t)) \
#                          ("LACKING" . org-warning) \
#                          ("REVIEWED" . "yellow") \
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