Mike Gerwitz

Free Software Hacker+Activist

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authorMike Gerwitz <mtg@gnu.org>2019-01-17 23:31:21 -0500
committerMike Gerwitz <mtg@gnu.org>2019-01-17 23:31:21 -0500
commitf47d0c60d4f00b75e29e7c1a180e5db1706cb0b3 (patch)
treedbe08ce8990c68d27f11d2dbdfacc70e8878bad2
parent5d60ae67d10debcd2958daafde6e12bde0503646 (diff)
downloadthoughts-f47d0c60d4f00b75e29e7c1a180e5db1706cb0b3.zip
thoughts-f47d0c60d4f00b75e29e7c1a180e5db1706cb0b3.tar.gz
thoughts-f47d0c60d4f00b75e29e7c1a180e5db1706cb0b3.tar.bz2
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diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules
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--- a/.gitmodules
+++ b/.gitmodules
@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-[submodule "docs/papers/coope"]
- path = docs/papers/coope
- url = git@gitorious.org:easejs/coope.git
-[submodule "docs/papers/cptt"]
- path = docs/papers/cptt
- url = https://mikegerwitz.com/projects/cptt
[submodule "papers/cptt"]
path = papers/cptt
url = https://mikegerwitz.com/projects/cptt
diff --git a/.listfilter b/.listfilter
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--- a/.listfilter
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-^61b8ae9e91048c7a96ddc63cbc7f0f006b52ea6d
-^ea177110c5b59d636ee856223ccaf522e96e36ad
diff --git a/asciidoc.conf b/asciidoc.conf
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-# Article configuration
-
-[miscellaneous]
-tabsize=4
-textwidth=80
-newline=\n
-
-[attributes]
-theme=style
-stylesdir=./stylesheets
-linkcss=1
-disable-javascript=1
diff --git a/docs/10-about.md b/docs/10-about.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9cfe790..0000000
--- a/docs/10-about.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-### About
-
-<img src="/images/me-libreplanet-2016.png"
- alt="Photo of Mike"
- title="LibrePlanet 2016 Talk 'Restore Online Freedom!'"
- class="inline-img avatar" />
-
-GPG Fingerprint: `D6E9 B930 028A 6C38 F43B 2388 FEF6 3574 5E6F 6D05` [\[?\]][gpg]
-
-Mike Gerwitz is a [free (as in freedom) software][0] [hacker] and activist
-with a focus on user privacy and security.
-While much of his earlier experience focused on web development, most of his
-free time is now spent researching cryptography; compilers; mathematics;
-security and privacy; and various other fields. He also closely follows the
-work of the [Free Software Foundation][0],
-[Electronic Frontier Foundation][3], and other entities devoted to free
-information and free society.
-
-Mike is the author of [GNU ease.js][easejs]; a member of the
-[GNU evaluation][gnueval] team; holds an administrative role in GNU; and is
-a volunteer for various other aspects of the [GNU Project] and the
-[Free Software Foundation].
-
-Mike is a [hacker], not a [cracker]---the latter breaks the security of
-systems, while the former expresses playful creativity in their work.
-
-Outside of his field, Mike enjoys time with his family---including his
-wife and two sons---who keep him very busy and help to keep him sane. Mike
-also has a fascination with a wide range of sciences that he wishes he had
-the time to devote to researching.
-
-A great deal of information regarding Mike's opinions on various topics can be
-found throughout this website. Much of this site is devoted to his thoughts and
-ramblings on various matters and so will contain material that is subject to
-strong bias; the reader is encouraged to construct his or her own opinions.
-Formal papers contain no such influence without rationale and references.
-
-Mike may be contacted at mtg at gnu dot org; he does not make use of "social
-media" websites, though he may (or may not) respond to queries on websites
-that he is a member of, and he does host his
-[own GNU Social instance][social].
-
-(Note: This website itself is free/libre---the source code is available via
-the commit hash links in the footer of various pages and the content is
-licensed for free distribution and, in most cases, modification.)
-
-[View my résumé.][resume]
-
-I recently changed GPG keys; see my [key transition statement][keytrans],
-signed with both my [new][keytrans-new] and [old][keytrans-old] keys.
-
-<span class="attribution">[LibrePlanet 2016 Photo][photo]
-Copyright&nbsp;&copy;&nbsp;2016 Kori&nbsp;Feener, [CC BY 4.0][ccby]; used
-with permission.</span>
-
-
-[0]: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/
-[hacker]: https://stallman.org/articles/on-hacking.html
-[cracker]: https://stallman.org/articles/on-hacking.html
-[GNU Project]: https://gnu.org/
-[Free Software Foundation]: https://fsf.org/
-[3]: http://eff.org/
-[easejs]: https://gnu.org/software/easejs
-[resume]: about/resume
-[gnueval]: https://www.gnu.org/help/evaluation.html
-[photo]: https://media.libreplanet.org/u/libreplanet/m/session-03-c-ms-png-libreplanet-2016-sessions-ec00/
-[ccby]: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
-[social]: https://social.mikegerwitz.com/
-
-[gpg]: https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/
-[keytrans]: /about/key-transition.txt
-[keytrans-old]: /about/key-transition.txt.old.asc
-[keytrans-new]: /about/key-transition.txt.new.asc
-
diff --git a/docs/20-projects.md b/docs/20-projects.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f923173..0000000
--- a/docs/20-projects.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-### Free Software Projects
-
-This page is a placeholder simply to generate a menu item.
-While it used to contain content,
- my server now routes this request to cgit.
-
-With that said---if you _are_ seeing this page,
- then something has gone horribly wrong!
-Do get in touch with me!
-
diff --git a/docs/30-papers.pg b/docs/30-papers.pg
deleted file mode 100644
index 09ee1eb..0000000
--- a/docs/30-papers.pg
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Papers / Articles
-
-More information on each work is provided via its respective link. If a thought
-post (that is---one of the posts that is listed on the index page) is of
-adequate length with sufficient references and content, it may too be included.
-
-[cat:docs/papers/.list]
diff --git a/docs/40-talks.md b/docs/40-talks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dd38aaf..0000000
--- a/docs/40-talks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-### Talks
-
-<span class="talk-logo">[![LibrePlanet 2018][lp2018-logo]][lp2018]</span>
-
-#### The Ethics Void (2018)
-
-[Video][ev-video] • [Slides][ev-slides-pdf]
-• [Slides Source Code][ev-src]
-
-Many communities have widely adopted codes of ethics governing the moral
-conduct of their members and professionals. Some of these codes may even be
-enshrined in law, and for good reason—certain conduct can have enormous
-consequences on the lives of others.
-
-Software and technology pervade virtually every aspect of our lives. Yet,
-when compared to other fields, our community leaders and educators have
-produced an ethics void. Last year, I introduced numerous topics concerning
-privacy, security, and freedom that raise serious ethical concerns. Join me
-this year as we consider some of those examples and others in an attempt to
-derive a code of ethics that compares to the moral obligations of other
-fields, and to consider how leaders and educators should approach ethics
-within education and guidance.
-
-
-
-<span class="talk-logo">[![LibrePlanet 2017][lp2017-logo]][lp2017]</span>
-
-#### The Surreptitious Assault on Privacy, Security, and Freedom (2017)
-
-[Video][sapsf-video] • [Slides][sapsf-slides-pdf]
-• [Slides Source Code][sapsf-src] • [Bibliography][sapsf-bib]
-
-Privacy, security, and personal freedom: one cannot be had without the
-others. Each of these essential rights are being surreptitiously
-assaulted; only the most technical among us even know what to look for, let
-alone how to defend ourselves. Governments, corporations, and groups of
-ill-minded individuals are spying and preying upon both users and bystanders
-with unprecedented frequency and breadth. For those of us who do understand
-these issues, it would be irresponsible not to fight for the rights of
-others and continue to bring these assaults to light.
-
-This talk will survey the most pressing issues of today, including topics of
-government surveillance and espionage; advertisers and data analytics; the
-Internet of Things; corporate negligence; public policy and the crypto
-wars; dangers of a non-free Web and untrusted, ephemeral software; pervasive
-monitoring; remote servers, services, and "the cloud"; modern vehicles;
-the fight against decentralization and free software; societal pressures and
-complacency with the status quo; and more.
-
-Attendees will walk away with a broad understanding of these topics; an
-overview of mitigations; and dozens of resources for further research and
-discussion with others. No prior knowledge of security or cryptography are
-necessary.
-
-
-
-<span class="talk-logo">[![LibrePlanet 2016][lp2016-logo]][lp2016]</span>
-
-#### Restore Online Freedom! (2016)
-
-[Video][rof] • [Slides][slides-pdf] • [Slides Source Code][slides-src]
-• [LibrePlanet Collection][collection]
-
-Imagine a world where surveillance is the default and users must opt-in to
-privacy. Imagine that your every action is logged and analyzed to learn how
-you behave, what your interests are, and what you might do next. Imagine
-that, even on your fully free operating system, proprietary software is
-automatically downloaded and run not only without your consent, but often
-without your knowledge. In this world, even free software cannot be easily
-modified, shared, or replaced. In many cases, you might not even be in
-control of your own computing---your actions and your data might be in
-control by a remote entity, and only they decide what you are and are not
-allowed to do.
-
-This may sound dystopian, but this is the world you're living in right
-now. The Web today is an increasingly hostile, freedom-denying place that
-propagates to nearly every aspect of the average users' lives---from their
-PCs to their phones, to their TVs and beyond. But before we can stand up
-and demand back our freedoms, we must understand what we're being robbed of,
-how it's being done, and what can (or can't) be done to stop it.
-
-[rof]: https://media.libreplanet.org/u/libreplanet/m/restore-online-freedom/
-[slides-pdf]: https://media.libreplanet.org/u/libreplanet/m/restore-online-freedom-14bf/
-[slides-src]: https://gitlab.com/mikegerwitz/online-freedom
-[collection]: https://media.libreplanet.org/u/libreplanet/collection/restore-online-freedom/
-
-[lp2016]: https://www.libreplanet.org/2016/
-[lp2016-logo]: /images/lp-2016.png
-
-[sapsf-slides-pdf]: /talks/sapsf.pdf
-[sapsf-video]: https://media.libreplanet.org/u/libreplanet/m/the-surreptitious-assault-on-privacy-security-and-freedom/
-[sapsf-src]: /projects/sapsf/
-[sapsf-bib]: /projects/sapsf/plain/sapsf.bib
-
-[lp2017]: https://www.libreplanet.org/2017/
-[lp2017-logo]: /images/lp-2017.png
-
-[ev-slides-pdf]: /talks/ethics-void.pdf
-[ev-video]: https://media.libreplanet.org/u/libreplanet/m/the-ethics-void/
-[ev-src]: /projects/ethics-void/
-
-[lp2018]: https://www.libreplanet.org/2018/
-[lp2018-logo]: /images/lp-2018.png
diff --git a/docs/404.pg b/docs/404.pg
deleted file mode 100644
index 45d6047..0000000
--- a/docs/404.pg
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-Page Not Found
-
-Sorry---the page you requested cannot be found; it may have been removed or you
-may have stumbled across a broken link. If you believe that you have received
-this message in error, please contact Mike directly. If you have arrived at this
-page from an external link, please contact the author of that website instead.
-
-[This is where one would insert the obligatory ``we apologize for the
-inconvenience''...but this is a personal site, not a business, so I'm not all
-that sympathetic. If it's a bug, it'll be fixed. If you think that the page
-you're looking for should exist (and that it did in the past), consider looking
-through this site's repository (available on the Projects page) and seeing what
-might have happened to it. Good day to you, kind sir/madam/otherwise.]
diff --git a/docs/about/githubbub.md b/docs/about/githubbub.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e2c1016..0000000
--- a/docs/about/githubbub.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-### GitHubbub! GitHub Does Not Value Software Freedom.
-
-<div class="inline-img octoflop">
- ![GitHub](/images/octoright-large.png "GitHub logo rotated 270° to resemble a Copyright symbol")
-</div>
-
-If you hit this page expecting to have been taken to my GitHub profile,
- then this is probably not what you were looking for;
- but let me tell you why you're here.
-
-Before providing a link to something hosted on a service,
- it is important to consider whether the service or website is antithetical
- to the message you are trying to convey to your readers/visitors,
- and whether it deserves clarification;
- there's a little bit of both here.
-
-If you're looking for a host friendly toward free software,
- take a look at the [GNU ethical repository criteria][gnu-repo],
- which sets standards for acceptable hosts to parts of the
- [GNU operating system][gnu].
-
-
-#### Non-Free JavaScript
-[Free software][freesw] guarantees your freedom to study,
- modify,
- and share the software that you use.
-We value these freedoms on the desktop,
- so why should we compromise when websites serve proprietary JavaScript
- [just because it creates the illusion of remote execution][whyfreejs]?
-When you visit a website that serves JavaScript to the client,
- your web browser is automatically [downloading and executing][jstrap]
- (often without your permission) ephemeral, unsigned, untrusted software.
-If that JavaScript is not [freely licensed][librejs],
- then the software running in your web browser is proprietary.
-
-**When you visit `github.com`,
- you download over 200kB of obfuscated code,
- much of which is proprietary.**
-This code provides many website features that are fairly essential,
- and *do not work with JavaScript disabled*:
-
-- Change repository names or descriptions;
-- Delete repositories;
-- Add an SSH key to your account;
-- Fork repositories;
-- Create pull requests;
-- Enable and disable project features;
-- Use the wiki and issue trackers;
-- View graphs of statistics;
-- And others.
-
-That is---GitHub forces you to run proprietary software in order to use much
- of their website.
-This is a bit startling for a host that owes its very existence to the
- success and development of free software.
-
-#### Desire To Remain Non-Free
-I contacted GitHub back in April 2014 pointing out these concerns and
- asking if they would be able to either liberate their JavaScript or make
- GitHub's essential functionality work without JavaScript enabled.
-The first response I received was from one of their "JavaScript Developers":
-
-> Hi Mike,
->
-> Thanks for getting in touch with us here. Some of our internal projects are
-> specific to running GitHub, and as such will probably remain closed. We do
-> make an effort to open source projects that we create that we think would be
-> beneficial to the community, some of which is JavaScript.
->
-> You can see a list of some of the open source projects that power GitHub
-> here:
->
-> https://github.com/showcases/projects-that-power-github
-
-This response is unfortunately misguided---yes,
- it is good that GitHub produces free software,
- but it is a false assumption that their proprietary code would serve no
- benefit to the community:
- the very existence of their proprietary software [gives them unjust
- control over their users][unjust];
- relinquishing that control is of benefit to the community.
-
-I replied to the above message to clarify my point.
-After receiving no response,
- I forwarded the e-mail to GitHub's original founders:
- [Tom Preston-Werner][tom],
- [Chris Wanstrath][chris],
- and [PJ Hyett][pj].
-The response I received from Chris was blunt and discouraging:
-
-> Hey Mike,
->
-> We have no plans to release github.com's JavaScript as free software at
-> this time, nor do we have plans to remove the site's dependence on
-> JavaScript. Thanks for the interest.
-
-The original correspondence is provided here:
-
-1. [Original request][gh-request] to `support@github.com`, Tom, Chris, and
- PJ.
-2. [Reply to my original request][gh-request-reply] from one of the developers.
-3. [My reply to the developer][gh-request2] providing more information and
- asking for a commitment.
-4. [Forward of my reply][gh-request3] to Tom, Chris, and PJ, after having
- received no response from the developer.
-5. [Response from Chris Wanstrath][gh-request3-reply] stating that GitHub
- has "no plans" to liberate its JavaScript or "remove the site's
- dependence on JavaScript".
-
-
-[gnu-repo]: https://www.gnu.org/software/repo-criteria.html
-[gnu]: https://www.gnu.org/gnu/gnu.html
-[freesw]: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html
-[whyfreejs]: https://www.gnu.org/software/easejs/whyfreejs.html
-[jstrap]: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/javascript-trap.html
-[librejs]: https://www.gnu.org/software/librejs/free-your-javascript.html
-[unjust]: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html
-[tom]: https://github.com/mojombo
-[chris]: https://github.com/defunkt
-[pj]: https://github.com/pjhyett
-
-[gh-request]: /docs/gh/email-request.txt
-[gh-request-reply]: /docs/gh/email-request-reply.txt
-[gh-request2]: /docs/gh/email-request2.txt
-[gh-request3]: /docs/gh/email-request3.txt
-[gh-request3-reply]: /docs/gh/email-request3-reply.txt
diff --git a/docs/about/gnu-inside-ex b/docs/about/gnu-inside-ex
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--- a/docs/about/gnu-inside-ex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-<div id="gnulinux-inside" style="position: absolute; top: 0px; right: 0px;">
- <a href="http://gnu.org/">
- <img src="https://www.gnu.org/graphics/gnu-inside.png"
- alt="GNU/Linux Inside!" title="GNU/Linux Inside!" />
- </a>
-</div>
diff --git a/docs/about/inside.pg b/docs/about/inside.pg
deleted file mode 100644
index 8fc68e5..0000000
--- a/docs/about/inside.pg
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-GNU/Linux Inside
-
-[img:heckert-gnu.png:GNU]
-
-This website and the server on which it is hosted is run entirely by [free
-software][0].
-
-Do you use GNU/Linux or other free software on your website? Flaunt it! Feel
-free to place the image below on your own website, blog, or anywhere else you
-see fit to let others know that you support GNU and free software.
-
-This image also helps to bring awareness to the [GNU operating system][1] as
-well as GNU's philosophy.[0] The majority of users today consider the operating
-system to be called ``Linux'', which is false---this is the name of the kernel;
-GNU is the operating system.[2]
-
-*The page fold is transparent*; it will therefore work well with any background
-color. Please note that this is a PNG with alphatransparency---older browsers
-that users shouldn't be using anymore (such as IE 6) will not render it properly
-unless you take the necessary precautions.
-
-[img:gnu-inside.png:GNU/Linux Inside!]
-
-Feel free to [download the source file (GIMP)][3], released under the [Creative
-Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Unported License][4]. It incorporates [``A
-Bold GNU Head''][5] by Aurelio A. Heckert, which appears at the top of this
-page. Below is the code with which you may embed this on your own website.
-
-[src:docs/about/gnu-inside-ex:html]
-
-
-[0] https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/
-[1] https://www.gnu.org/
-[2] http://www.gnu.org/gnu/linux-and-gnu.html
-[3] https://www.gnu.org/graphics/gnu-inside.html
-[4] https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/
-[5] https://www.gnu.org/graphics/heckert_gnu.html
diff --git a/docs/hoxsl/index.md b/docs/hoxsl/index.md
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index f074cf4..0000000
--- a/docs/hoxsl/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-### hoxsl
-
-hoxsl (pronounced like "voxel") is a library for XSLT 2.0, written in pure
-XSLT, that introduces various types of higher-order logic, including
-higher-order functions; functional abstractions for common operations; and
-XSLT templates that take XSLT as input and produce XSLT as output.
-
-This project is written in a [literate][] style; [see the manual][manual]
-for more information.
-
-[Source code][src]
-
-This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
-under the terms of the [GNU General Public License][gpl] as published by the
-Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your
-option) any later version.
-
-[literate]: http://www.literateprogramming.com/
-[manual]: manual/
-[src]: http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/hoxsl.git
-[gpl]: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
diff --git a/docs/papers/.gitignore b/docs/papers/.gitignore
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--- a/docs/papers/.gitignore
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-*.html
diff --git a/docs/papers/cptt b/docs/papers/cptt
deleted file mode 160000
-Subproject 41a35f3c37fd41772ff7ae8aca62d77c4cafcf6
diff --git a/docs/papers/git-horror-story.txt b/docs/papers/git-horror-story.txt
deleted file mode 100644
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--- a/docs/papers/git-horror-story.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1326 +0,0 @@
-A Git Horror Story: Repository Integrity With Signed Commits
-============================================================
-Mike Gerwitz <mtg@gnu.org>
-
-_(Note: This article was written at the end of 2012 and is out of date. I
-will update it at some point, but until then, please keep that in
-perspective.)_
-
-It's 2:00 AM. The house is quiet, the kid is in bed and your significant other
-has long since fallen asleep on the couch waiting for you, the light of the TV
-flashing out of the corner of your eye. Your mind and body are exhausted.
-Satisfied with your progress for the night, you commit the code you've been
-hacking for hours: +``[master 2e4fd96] Fixed security vulnerability CVE-123''+.
-You push your changes to your host so that others can view and comment on your
-progress before tomorrow's critical release, suspend your PC and struggle to
-wake your significant other to get him/her in bed. You turn off the lights, trip
-over a toy on your way to the bedroom and sigh as you realize you're going to
-have to make a bottle for the child who just heard his/her favorite toy jingle.
-
-Fast forward four sleep-deprived hours. You are woken to the sound of your phone
-vibrating incessantly. You smack it a few times, thinking it's your alarm clock,
-then fumble half-blind as you try to to dig it out from under the bed after you
-knock it off the nightstand. (Oops, you just woke the kid up again.) You pick up
-the phone and are greeted by a frantic colleague. ``I merged in our changes. We
-need to tag and get this fix out there.'' Ah, damnit. You wake up your
-significant other, asking him/her to deal with the crying child (yeah, that went
-well) and stumble off to your PC, failing your first attempt to enter your
-password. You rub your eyes and pull the changes.
-
-Still squinting, you glance at the flood of changes presented to you. Your
-child is screaming in the background, not amused by your partner's feeble
-attempts to console him/her. `git log --pretty=short`...everything looks
-good---just a bunch of commits from you and your colleague that were merged in.
-You run the test suite---everything passes. Looks like you're ready to go. `git
-tag -s 1.2.3 -m 'Various bugfixes, including critical CVE-123' && git push
---tags`. After struggling to enter the password to your private key, slowly
-standing up from your chair as you type, you run off to help with the baby
-(damnit, where do they keep the source code for these things). Your CI system
-will handle the rest.
-
-Fast forward two months.
-
-CVE-123 has long been fixed and successfully deployed. However, you receive an
-angry call from your colleague. It seems that one of your most prominent users
-has had a massive security breach. After researching the problem, your colleague
-found that, according to the history, _the breach exploited a back door that you
-created!_ What? You would never do such a thing. To make matters worse, +1.2.3+
-was signed off by you, using your GPG key---you affirmed that this tag was
-good and ready to go. ``3-b-c-4-2-b, asshole'', scorns your colleague. ``Thanks
-a lot.''
-
-No---that doesn't make sense. You quickly check the history. `git log --patch
-3bc42b`. ``Added missing docblocks for X, Y and Z.'' You form a puzzled
-expression, raising your hands from the keyboard slightly before tapping the
-space bar a few times with few expectations. Sure enough, in with a few minor
-docblock changes, there was one very inconspicuous line change that added the
-back door to the authentication system. The commit message is fairly clear and
-does not raise any red flags---why would you check it? Furthermore, the
-author of the commit _was indeed you!_
-
-Thoughts race through your mind. How could this have happened? That commit has
-your name, but you do not recall ever having made those changes. Furthermore,
-you would have never made that line change; it simply does not make sense. Did
-your colleague frame you by committing as you? Was your colleague's system
-compromised? Was your _host_ compromised? It couldn't have been your local
-repository; that commit was clearly part of the merge and did not exist in your
-local repository until your pull on that morning two months ago.
-
-Regardless of what happened, one thing is horrifically clear: right now, you are
-the one being blamed.
-
-[[trust]]
-Who Do You Trust?
------------------
-Theorize all you want---it's possible that you may never fully understand what
-resulted in the compromise of your repository. The above story is purely
-hypothetical, but entirely within the realm of possibility. How can you rest
-assured that your repository is safe for not only those who would reference or
-clone it, but also those who may download, for example, tarballs that are
-created from it?
-
-Git is a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_revision_control[distributed
-revision control system]. In short, this means that anyone can have a copy of
-your repository to work on offline, in private. They may commit to their own
-repository and users may push/pull from each other. A central repository is
-unnecessary for distributed revision control systems, but
-http://lwn.net/Articles/246381/[may be used to provide an ``official'' hub that
-others can work on and clone from]. Consequently, this also means that a
-repository floating around for project X may contain malicious code; just
-because someone else hands you a repository for your project doesn't mean that
-you should actually use it.
-
-The question is not ``Who _can_ you trust?''; the question is ``Who _do_ you
-trust?'', or rather---who _are_ you trusting with your repository, right now,
-even if you do not realize it? For most projects, including the story above,
-there are a number of individuals or organizations that you may have
-inadvertently placed your trust in without fully considering the ramifications
-of such a decision:
-
-[[trust-host]] Git Host::
- Git hosting providers are probably the most easily overlooked
- trustees---providers like Gitorious, GitHub, Bitbucket, SourceForge, Google
- Code, etc. Each provides hosting for your repository and ``secures'' it by
- allowing only you, or other authorized users, to push to it, often with the
- use of SSH keys tied to an account. By using a host as the primary holder of
- your repository---the repository from which most clone and push to---you are
- entrusting them with the entirety of your project; you are stating, ``Yes, I
- trust that my source code is safe with you and will not be tampered with''.
- This is a dangerous assumption. Do you trust that your host properly secures
- your account information? Furthermore, bugs exist in all but the most
- trivial pieces of software, so what is to say that there is not a
- vulnerability just waiting to be exploited in your host's system, completely
- compromising your repository? +
- +
- It was not too long ago (March 4th, 2012) that
- https://github.com/blog/1068-public-key-security-vulnerability-and-mitigation[
- a public key security vulnerability at GitHub] was
- https://gist.github.com/1978249[exploited] by a Russian man named
- http://homakov.blogspot.com/2012/03/im-disappoint-github.html[Egor Homakov],
- allowing him to successfully
- https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/b83965785db1eec019edf1fc272b1aa393e6dc57[
- commit to the master branch of the Ruby on Rails framework] repository
- hosted on GitHub. Oops.
-
-Friends and Coworkers/Colleagues::
- There may be certain groups or individuals that you trust enough to (a) pull
- or accept patches from or (b) allow them to push to you or a
- central/``official'' repository. Operating under the assumption that each
- individual is truly trustworthy (and let us hope that is the case), that
- does not immediately imply that their _repository_ can be trusted. What are
- their security policies? Do they leave their PC unlocked and unattended? Do
- they make a habit of downloading virus-laden pornography on an unsecured,
- non-free operating system? Or perhaps, through no fault of their own, they
- are running a piece of software that is vulnerable to a 0-day exploit. Given
- that, _how can you be sure that their commits are actually their own_?
- Furthermore, how can you be sure that any commits they approve (or sign off
- on using `git commit -s`) were actually approved by them? +
- +
- That is, of course, assuming that they have no ill intent. For example, what
- of the pissed off employee looking to get the arrogant, obnoxious co-worker
- fired by committing under the coworker's name/email? What if you were the
- manager or project lead? Whose word would you take? How would you even know
- whom to suspect?
-
-Your Own Repository::
- Linus Torvalds (original author of Git and the kernel Linux)
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XpnKHJAok8[keeps a secured repository on his
- personal computer, inaccessible by any external means] to ensure that he has
- a repository he can fully trust. Most developers simply keep a local copy on
- whatever PC they happen to be hacking on and pay no mind to security---their
- repository is likely hosted elsewhere as well, after all; Git is
- distributed. This is, however, a very serious matter. +
- +
- You likely use your PC for more than just hacking. Most notably, you likely
- use your PC to browse the Internet and download software. Software is buggy.
- Buggy software has exploits and exploits tend to get, well, exploited. Not
- every developer has a strong understanding of the best security practices
- for their operating system (if you do, great!). And no---simply using
- GNU/Linux or any other *NIX variant does not make you immune from every
- potential threat.
-
-To dive into each of these a bit more deeply, let us consider one of the world's
-largest free software projects---the kernel Linux---and how its original
-creator Linus Torvalds handles issues of trust. During
-http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XpnKHJAok8[a talk he presented at Google in
-2007], he describes a network of trust he created between himself and a number
-of others (which he refers to as his ``lieutenants''). Linus himself cannot
-possibly manage the mass amount of code that is sent to him, so he has others
-handle portions of the kernel. Those ``lieutenants'' handle most of the
-requests, then submit them to Linus, who handles merging into his own branch. In
-doing so, he has trusted that these lieutenants know what they are doing, are
-carefully looking over each patch and that the patches Linus receives from them
-are actually from them.
-
-I am not aware of how patches are communicated from the lieutenants to Linus.
-Certainly, one way to state with a fairly high level of certainty that the patch
-is coming from one of his ``lieutenants'' is to e-mail the patches, signed with
-their respective GPG/PGP keys. At that point, the web of trust is enforced by
-the signature. Linus is then sure that his private repository (which he does his
-best to secure, as aforementioned) contains only data that _he personally
-trusts_. His repository is safe, so far as he knows, and he can use it
-confidently.
-
-At this point, assuming Linus' web of trust is properly verified, how can he
-confidently convey these trusted changes to others? He certainly knows his own
-commits, but how should others know that this ``Linus Torvalds'' guy who has
-been committing and signing off of on commits is _actually_ Linus Torvalds? As
-demonstrated in the hypothetical scenario at the beginning of this article,
-anyone could claim to be Linus. If an attacker were to gain access to any clone
-of the repository and commit as Linus, nobody would know the difference.
-Fortunately, one can get around this by signing a tag with his/her private key
-using GPG (`git tag -s`). A tag points to a particular commit and that commit
-xref:commit-history[depends on the entire history leading up to that commit].
-This means that signing the SHA1 hash of that commit, assuming no security
-vulnerabilities within SHA1, will forever state that the entire history of the
-given commit, as pointed to by the given tag, is trusted.
-
-Well, that is helpful, but that doesn't help to verify any commits made _after_
-the tag (until the next tag comes around that includes that commit as an
-ancestor of the new tag). Nor does it necessarily guarantee the integrity of all
-past commits---it only states that, _to the best of Linus' knowledge_, this
-tree is trusted. Notice how the hypothetical you in our hypothetical story also
-signed the tag with his/her private key. Unfortunately, he/she fell prey to
-something that is all too common---human error. He/she trusted that his/her
-``trusted'' colleague could actually be fully trusted. Wouldn't it be nice if we
-could remove some of that human error from the equation?
-
-
-[[trust-ensure]]
-Ensuring Trust
---------------
-What if we had a way to ensure that a commit by someone named "Mike Gerwitz"
-with my e-mail address is _actually_ a commit from myself, much like we
-can assert that a tag signed with my private key was actually tagged by myself?
-Well, who are we trying to prove this to? If you are only proving your identity
-to a project author/maintainer, then you can identify yourself in any reasonable
-manner. For example, if you work within the same internal network, perhaps you
-can trust that pushes from the internal IP are secure. If sending via e-mail,
-you can sign the patch using your GPG key. Unfortunately, _these only extend
-this level of trust to the author/maintainer, not other users!_ If I were to
-clone your repository and look at the history, how do I know that a commit from
-``Foo Bar'' is truly a commit from Foo Bar, especially if the repository
-frequently accepts patches and merge requests from many users?
-
-Previously, only tags could be signed using GPG. Fortunately,
-http://git.kernel.org/?p=git/git.git;a=blob_plain;f=Documentation/RelNotes/1.7.9.txt;hb=HEAD[
-Git v1.7.9 introduced the ability to GPG-sign individual commits]---a feature
-I have been long awaiting. Consider what may have happened to the story at the
-beginning of this article if you signed each of your commits like so:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git commit -S -m 'Fixed security vulnerability CVE-123'
-# ^ GPG-sign commit
-----
-
-Notice the `-S` flag above, instructing Git to sign the commit using your
-GPG key (please note the difference between `-s` and `-S`). If you followed this
-practice for each of your commits---with no exceptions---then you (or anyone
-else, for that matter) could say with relative certainty that the commit was
-indeed authored by yourself. In the case of our story, you could then defend
-yourself, stating that if the backdoor commit truly were yours, it would have
-been signed. (Of course, one could argue that you simply did not sign that
-commit in order to use that excuse. We'll get into addressing such an issue in a
-bit.)
-
-In order to set up your signing key, you first need to get your key id using
-`gpg --list-secret-keys`:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ gpg --list-secret-keys | grep ^sec
-sec 4096R/8EE30EAB 2011-06-16 [expires: 2014-04-18]
-# ^^^^^^^^
-----
-
-You are interested in the hexadecimal value immediately following the forward
-slash in the above output (your output may vary drastically; do not worry if
-your key does not contain +4096R+ as above). If you have multiple secret
-keys, select the one you wish to use for signing your commits. This value will
-be assigned to the Git configuration value +user.signingkey+:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-# remove --global to use this key only on the current repository
-$ git config --global user.signingkey 8EE30EAB
-# ^ replace with your key id
-----
-
-Given the above, let's give commit signing a shot. To do so, we will create a
-test repository and work through that for the remainder of this article.
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ mkdir tmp && cd tmp
-$ git init .
-$ echo foo > foo
-$ git add foo
-$ git commit -S -m 'Test commit of foo'
-
-You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
-user: "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-4096-bit RSA key, ID 8EE30EAB, created 2011-06-16
-
-[master (root-commit) cf43808] Test commit of foo
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
- create mode 100644 foo
-----
-
-The only thing that has been done differently between this commit and an
-unsigned commit is the addition of the `-S` flag, indicating that we want
-to GPG-sign the commit. If everything has been set up properly, you should be
-prompted for the password to your secret key (unless you have `gpg-agent`
-running), after which the commit will continue as you would expect, resulting in
-something similar to the above output (your GPG details and SHA-1 hash will
-differ).
-
-By default (at least in Git v1.7.9), `git log` will not list or validate
-signatures. In order to display the signature for our commit, we may use the
-`--show-signature` option, as shown below:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --show-signature
-commit cf43808e85399467885c444d2a37e609b7d9e99d
-gpg: Signature made Fri 20 Apr 2012 11:59:01 PM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Fri Apr 20 23:59:01 2012 -0400
-
- Test commit of foo
-----
-
-There is an important distinction to be made here---the commit author and the
-signature attached to the commit _may represent two different people_. In other
-words: the commit signature is similar in concept to the `-s` option, which adds
-a +Signed-off+ line to the commit---it verifies that you have signed off on
-the commit, but does not necessarily imply that you authored it. To demonstrate
-this, consider that we have received a patch from ``John Doe'' that we wish to
-apply. The policy for our repository is that every commit must be signed by a
-trusted individual; all other commits will be rejected by the project
-maintainers. To demonstrate without going through the hassle of applying an
-actual patch, we will simply do the following:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ echo patch from John Doe >> foo
-$ git commit -S --author="John Doe <john@doe.name>" -am 'Added feature X'
-
-You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
-user: "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-4096-bit RSA key, ID 8EE30EAB, created 2011-06-16
-
-[master 16ddd46] Added feature X
- Author: John Doe <john@doe.name>
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-$ git log --show-signature
-commit 16ddd46b0c191b0e130d0d7d34c7fc7af03f2d3e
-gpg: Signature made Sat 21 Apr 2012 12:14:38 AM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-Author: John Doe <john@doe.name>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 00:14:38 2012 -0400
-
- Added feature X
-# [...]
-----
-
-This then raises the question---what is to be done about those who decide to
-sign their commit with their own GPG key? There are a couple options here.
-First, consider the issue from a maintainer's perspective---do we necessary
-care about the identity of a 3rd party contributor, so long as the provided code
-is acceptable? That depends. From a legal standpoint, we may, but not every user
-has a GPG key. Given that, someone creating a key for the sole purpose of
-signing a few commits without some means of identity verification, only to
-discard the key later (or forget that it exists) does little to verify one's
-identity. (Indeed, the whole concept behind PGP is to create a web of trust by
-being able to verify that the person who signed using their key is actually who
-they say they are, so such a scenario defeats the purpose.) Therefore, adopting
-a strict signing policy for everyone who contributes a patch is likely to be
-unsuccessful. Linux and Git satisfy this legal requirement with a
-+``Signed-off-by''+ line in the commit, signifying that the author agrees to the
-http://git.kernel.org/?p=git/git.git;a=blob;f=Documentation/SubmittingPatches;h=0dbf2c9843dd3eed014d788892c8719036287308;hb=HEAD[
-Developer's Certificate of Origin]; this essentially states that the author has
-the legal rights to the code contained within the commit. When accepting patches
-from 3rd parties who are outside of your web of trust to begin with, this is the
-next best thing.
-
-To adopt this policy for patches, require that authors do the following and
-request that they do not GPG-sign their commits:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git commit -asm 'Signed off'
-# ^ -s flag adds Signed-off-by line
-$ git log
-commit ca05f0c2e79c5cd712050df6a343a5b707e764a9
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 15:46:05 2012 -0400
-
- Signed off
-
- Signed-off-by: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-# [...]
-----
-
-Then, when you receive the patch, you can apply it with the `-S` (capital, not
-lowercase) to GPG-sign the commit; this will preserve the Signed-off-by line as
-well. In the case of a pull request, you can sign the commit by amending it
-(`git commit -S --amend`). Note, however, that the SHA-1 hash of the commit will
-change when you do so.
-
-What if you want to preserve the signature of whomever sent the pull request?
-You cannot amend the commit, as that would alter the commit and invalidate their
-signature, so dual-signing it is not an option (if Git were to even support that
-option). Instead, you may consider signing the merge commit, which will be
-discussed in the following section.
-
-
-Managing Large Merges
----------------------
-Up to this point, our discussion consisted of apply patches or merging single
-commits. What shall we do, then, if we receive a pull request for a certain
-feature or bugfix with, say, 300 commits (which I assure you is not unusual)? In
-such a case, we have a few options:
-
-. [[merge-1]] *Request that the user squash all the commits into a single commit*,
- thereby avoiding the problem entirely by applying the previously discussed
- methods. I personally dislike this option for a few reasons:
-** We can no longer follow the history of that feature/bugfix in order to learn
- how it was developed or see alternative solutions that were attempted but
- later replaced.
-** It renders `git bisect` useless. If we find a bug in the software that was
- introduced by a single patch consisting of 300 squashed commits, we are left
- to dig through the code and debug ourselves, rather than having Git possibly
- figure out the problem for us.
-
-. [[merge-2]] *Adopt a security policy that requires signing only the merge
- commit* (forcing a merge commit to be created with `--no-ff` if needed).
-** This is certainly the quickest solution, allowing a reviewer to sign the
- merge after having reviewed the diff in its entirety.
-** However, it leaves individual commits open to exploitation. For example, one
- commit may introduce a payload that a future commit removes, thereby hiding
- it from the overall diff, but introducing terrible effect should the commit
- be checked out individually (e.g. by `git bisect`). Squashing all commits
- (xref:merge-1[option #1]), signing each commit individually
- (xref:merge-3[option #3]), or simply reviewing each commit individually
- before performing the merge (without signing each individual commit) would
- prevent this problem.
-** This also does not fully prevent the situation mentioned in the hypothetical
- story at the beginning of this article---others can still commit with you
- as the author, but the commit would not have been signed.
-** Preserves the SHA-1 hashes of each individual commit.
-
-. [[merge-3]] *Sign each commit to be introduced by the merge.*
-** The tedium of this chore can be greatly reduced by using
- http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Invoking-GPG_002dAGENT.html[
- `gpg-agent`].
-** Be sure to carefully review _each commit_ rather than the entire diff to
- ensure that no malicious commits sneak into the history (see bullets for
- xref:merge-2[option #2]). If you instead decide to script the sign of each
- commit without reviewing each individual diff, you may as well go with
- xref:merge-2[option #2].
-** Also useful if one needs to cherry-pick individual commits, since that would
- result in all commits having been signed.
-** One may argue that this option is unnecessarily redundant, considering that
- one can simply review the individual commits without signing them, then
- simply sign the merge commit to signify that all commits have been reviewed
- (xref:merge-2[option #2]). The important point to note here is that this
- option offers _proof_ that each commit was reviewed (unless it is automated).
-** This will create a new for each (the SHA-1 hash is not preserved).
-
-Which of the three options you choose depends on what factors are important and
-feasible for your particular project. Specifically:
-
-* If history is not important to you, then you can avoid a lot of trouble by
- simply requiring the the commits be squashed (xref:merge-1[option #1]).
-* If history _is_ important to you, but you do not have the time to review
- individual commits:
-** Use xref:merge-2[option #2] if you understand its risks.
-** Otherwise, use xref:merge-3[option #3], but _do not_ automate the signing
- process to avoid having to look at individual commits. If you wish to keep
- the history, do so responsibly.
-
-Option #1 in the list above can easily be applied to the discussion in the
-previous section.
-
-
-(Option #2)
-~~~~~~~~~~~
-xref:merge-2[Option #2] is as simple as passing the `-S` argument to `git
-merge`. If the merge is a fast-forward (that is, all commits can simply be
-applied atop of +HEAD+ without any need for merging), then you would need to use
-the `--no-ff` option to force a merge commit.
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-# set up another branch to merge
-$ git checkout -b bar
-$ echo bar > bar
-$ git add bar
-$ git commit -m 'Added bar'
-$ echo bar2 >> bar
-$ git commit -am 'Modified bar'
-$ git checkout master
-
-# perform the actual merge (will be a fast-forward, so --no-ff is needed)
-$ git merge -S --no-ff bar
-# ^ GPG-sign merge commit
-
-You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
-user: "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-4096-bit RSA key, ID 8EE30EAB, created 2011-06-16
-
-Merge made by the 'recursive' strategy.
- bar | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 bar
-----
-
-Inspecting the log, we will see the following:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --show-signature
-commit ebadba134bde7ae3d39b173bf8947a69be089cf6
-gpg: Signature made Sun 22 Apr 2012 11:36:17 AM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-Merge: 652f9ae 031f6ee
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sun Apr 22 11:36:15 2012 -0400
-
- Merge branch 'bar'
-
-commit 031f6ee20c1fe601d2e808bfb265787d56732974
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 17:35:27 2012 -0400
-
- Modified bar
-
-commit ce77088d85dee3d687f1b87d21c7dce29ec2cff1
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 17:35:20 2012 -0400
-
- Added bar
-# [...]
-----
-
-Notice how the merge commit contains the signature, but the two commits involved
-in the merge (`031f6ee` and `ce77088`) do not. Herein lies the problem---what
-if commit `031f6ee` contained the backdoor mentioned in the story at the
-beginning of the article? This commit is supposedly authored by you, but because
-it lacks a signature, it could actually be authored by anyone. Furthermore, if
-`ce77088` contained malicious code that was removed in `031f6ee`, then it would
-not show up in the diff between the two branches. That, however, is an issue
-that needs to be addressed by your security policy. Should you be reviewing
-individual commits? If so, a review would catch any potential problems with the
-commits and wouldn't require signing each commit individually. The merge itself
-could be representative of ``Yes, I have reviewed each commit individually and I
-see no problems with these changes.''
-
-If the commitment to reviewing each individual commit is too large, consider
-xref:merge-1[Option #1].
-
-(Option #3)
-~~~~~~~~~~~
-xref:merge-3[Option #3] in the above list makes the review of each commit
-explicit and obvious; with xref:merge-2[option #2], one could simply lazily
-glance through the commits or not glance through them at all. That said, one
-could do the same with xref:merge-3[option #3] by automating the signing of each
-commit, so it could be argued that this option is completely unnecessary. Use
-your best judgment.
-
-The only way to make this option remotely feasible, especially for a large
-number of commits, is to perform the audit in such a way that we do not have to
-re-enter our secret key passphrases for each and every commit. For this, we can
-use
-http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Invoking-GPG_002dAGENT.html[
-`gpg-agent`], which will safely store the passphrase in memory for the next time
-that it is requested. Using `gpg-agent`,
-http://stackoverflow.com/questions/9713781/how-to-use-gpg-agent-to-bulk-sign-git-tags/10263139[
-we will only be prompted for the password a single time]. Depending on how you
-start `gpg-agent`, _be sure to kill it after you are done!_
-
-The process of signing each commit can be done in a variety of ways. Ultimately,
-since signing the commit will result in an entirely new commit, the method you
-choose is of little importance. For example, if you so desired, you could
-cherry-pick individual commits and then `-S --amend` them, but that would
-not be recognized as a merge and would be terribly confusing when looking
-through the history for a given branch (unless the merge would have been a
-fast-forward). Therefore, we will settle on a method that will still produce a
-merge commit (again, unless it is a fast-forward). One such way to do this is to
-interactively rebase each commit, allowing you to easily view the diff, sign it,
-and continue onto the next commit.
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-# create a new audit branch off of bar
-$ git checkout -b bar-audit bar
-$ git rebase -i master
-# | ^ the branch that we will be merging into
-# ^ interactive rebase (alternatively: long option --interactive)
-----
-
-First, we create a new branch off of +bar+---+bar-audit+---to perform the
-rebase on (see +bar+ branch created in demonstration of xref:merge-2[option
-#2]). Then, in order to step through each commit that would be merged into
-+master+, we perform a rebase using +master+ as the upstream branch. This will
-present every commit that is in +bar-audit+ (and consequently +bar+) that is not
-in +master+, opening them in your preferred editor:
-
-----
-e ce77088 Added bar
-e 031f6ee Modified bar
-
-# Rebase 652f9ae..031f6ee onto 652f9ae
-#
-# Commands:
-# p, pick = use commit
-# r, reword = use commit, but edit the commit message
-# e, edit = use commit, but stop for amending
-# s, squash = use commit, but meld into previous commit
-# f, fixup = like "squash", but discard this commit's log message
-# x, exec = run command (the rest of the line) using shell
-#
-# If you remove a line here THAT COMMIT WILL BE LOST.
-# However, if you remove everything, the rebase will be aborted.
-#
-----
-
-To modify the commits, replace each +pick+ with +e+ (or +edit+), as shown above.
-(In vim you can also do the following `ex` command: +:%s/^pick/e/+;
-adjust regex flavor for other editors). Save and close. You will then be
-presented with the first (oldest) commit:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-Stopped at ce77088... Added bar
-You can amend the commit now, with
-
- git commit --amend
-
-Once you are satisfied with your changes, run
-
- git rebase --continue
-
-# first, review the diff (alternatively, use tig/gitk)
-$ git diff HEAD^
-# if everything looks good, sign it
-$ git commit -S --amend
-# GPG-sign ^ ^ amend commit, preserving author, etc
-
-You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
-user: "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-4096-bit RSA key, ID 8EE30EAB, created 2011-06-16
-
-[detached HEAD 5cd2d91] Added bar
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
- create mode 100644 bar
-
-# continue with next commit
-$ git rebase --continue
-
-# repeat.
-$ ...
-Successfully rebased and updated refs/heads/bar-audit.
-----
-
-Looking through the log, we can see that the commits have been rewritten to
-include the signatures (consequently, the SHA-1 hashes do not match):
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --show-signature HEAD~2..
-commit afb1e7373ae5e7dae3caab2c64cbb18db3d96fba
-gpg: Signature made Sun 22 Apr 2012 01:37:26 PM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 17:35:27 2012 -0400
-
- Modified bar
-
-commit f227c90b116cc1d6770988a6ca359a8c92a83ce2
-gpg: Signature made Sun 22 Apr 2012 01:36:44 PM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 17:35:20 2012 -0400
-
- Added bar
-----
-
-We can then continue to merge into +master+ as we normally would. The next
-consideration is whether or not to sign the merge commit as we would with
-xref:merge-2[option #2]. In the case of our example, the merge is a
-fast-forward, so the merge commit is unnecessary (since the commits being merged
-are already signed, we have no need to create a merge commit using `--no-ff`
-purely for the purpose of signing it). However, consider that you may perform
-the audit yourself and leave the actual merge process to someone else; perhaps
-the project has a system in place where project maintainers must review the code
-and sign off on it, and then other developers are responsible for merging and
-managing conflicts. In that case, you may want a clear record of who merged the
-changes in.
-
-
-Enforcing Trust
----------------
-Now that you have determined a security policy appropriate for your particular
-project/repository (well, hypothetically at least), some way is needed to
-enforce your signing policies. While manual enforcement is possible, it is
-subject to human error, peer scrutiny (``just let it through!'') and is
-unnecessarily time-consuming. Fortunately, this is one of those things that you
-can script, sit back and enjoy.
-
-Let us first focus on the simpler of automation tasks---checking to ensure
-that _every_ commit is both signed and trusted (within our web of trust). Such
-an implementation would also satisfy xref:merge-3[option #3] in regards to
-merging. Well, perhaps not every commit will be considered. Chances are, you
-have an existing repository with a decent number of commits. If you were to go
-back and sign all those commits, you would completely alter the history of the
-entire repository, potentially creating headaches for other users. Instead, you
-may consider beginning your checks _after_ a certain commit.
-
-[[commit-history]]
-Commit History In a Nutshell
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The SHA-1 hashes of each commit in Git are created using the delta _and_ header
-information for each commit. This header information includes the commit's
-_parent_, whose header contains its parent---so on and so forth. In addition,
-Git depends on the entire history of the repository leading up to a given commit
-to construct the requested revision. Consequently, this means that the history
-cannot be altered without someone noticing (well, this is not entirely true;
-we'll discuss that in a moment). For example, consider the following branch:
-
-----
-Pre-attack:
-
----o---o---A---B---o---o---H
- a1b2c3d^
-----
-
-Above, +H+ represents the current +HEAD+ and commit identified by +A+ is the
-parent of commit +B+. For the sake of discussion, let's say that commit +A+ is
-identified by the SHA-1 fragment +a1b2c3d+. Let us say that an attacker decides
-to replace commit +A+ with another commit. In doing so, the SHA-1 hash of the
-commit must change to match the new delta and contents of the header. This new
-commit is identified as +X+:
-
-----
-Post-attack:
-
----o---o---X---B---o---o---H
- d4e5f6a^ ^!expects parent a1b2c3d
-----
-
-We now have a problem; when Git encounters commit +B+ (remember, Git must build
-+H+ using the entire history leading up to it), it will check its SHA-1 hash and
-notice that it no longer matches the hash of its parent. The attacker is unable
-to change the expected hash in commit +B+, because the header is used to
-generate the SHA-1 hash for the commit, meaning +B+ would then have a different
-SHA-1 hash (technically speaking, it would not longer be +B+---it would be an
-entirely different commit; we retain the identifier here only for demonstration
-purposes). That would then invalidate any children of +B+, so on and so forth.
-Therefore, in order to rewrite the history for a single commit, _the entire
-history after that commit must also be rewritten_ (as is done by `git rebase`).
-Should that be done, the SHA-1 hash of +H+ would also need to change. Otherwise,
-+H+'s history would be invalid and Git would immediately throw an error upon
-attempting a checkout.
-
-This has a very important consequence---given any commit, we can rest
-assured that, if it exists in the repository, Git will _always_ reconstruct that
-commit exactly as it was created (including all the history leading up to that
-commit _when_ it was created), or it will not do so at all. Indeed, as Linus
-mentions in a presentation at Google,
-http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XpnKHJAok8[he need only remember the SHA-1 hash
-of a single commit] to rest assured that, given any other repository, in the
-event of a loss of his own, that commit will represent exactly the same commit
-that it did in his own repository. What does that mean for us? Importantly, it
-means that *we do not have to rewrite history to sign each commit*, because the
-history of our _next_ signed commit is guaranteed. The only downside is, of
-course, that the history itself could have already been exploited in a manner
-similar to our initial story, but an automated mass-signing of all past commits
-for a given author wouldn't catch such a thing anyway.
-
-That said, it is important to understand that the integrity of your repository
-guaranteed only if a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_collision[hash
-collision] cannot be created---that is, if an attacker were able to create the
-same SHA-1 hash with _different_ data, then the child commit(s) would still be
-valid and the repository would have been successfully compromised.
-http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html[Vulnerabilities
-have been known in SHA-1] since 2005 that allow hashes to be computed
-http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html[faster than brute
-force], although they are not cheap to exploit. Given that, while your
-repository may be safe for now, there will come some point in the future where
-SHA-1 will be considered as crippled as MD5 is today. At that point in time,
-however, maybe Git will offer a secure migration solution to
-http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/git/2006/8/27/211001[an algorithm like
-SHA-256] or better. Indeed,
-http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/git/2006/8/27/211020[SHA-1 hashes were never
-intended to make Git cryptographically secure].
-
-Given that, the average person is likely to be fine with leaving his/her history
-the way it is. We will operate under that assumption for our implementation,
-offering the ability to ignore all commits prior to a certain commit. If one
-wishes to validate all commits, the reference commit can simply be omitted.
-
-[[automate]]
-Automating Signature Checks
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The idea behind verifying that certain commits are trusted is fairly simple:
-
-=========================================================================
-Given reference commit +r+ (optionally empty), let
-+C+ be the set of all commits such that +C+ = +r..HEAD+
-(http://book.git-scm.com/4_git_treeishes.html[range spec]) and let
-+K+ be the set of all public keys in a given GPG keyring. We must assert
-that, for each commit +c+ in +C+, there must exist a key
-+k+ in keyring +K+ such that +k+ is
-https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust[trusted] and can be used to
-verify the signature of +c+. This assertion is denoted by the function `\(g\)`
-(GPG) in the following expression: `\(\forall{c}{\in}\mathbf{C}\, g(c)\)`.
-=========================================================================
-
-Fortunately, as we have already seen in previous sections with the
-`--show-signature` option to `git log`, Git handles the signature verification
-for us; this reduces our implementation to a simple shell script. However, the
-output we've been dealing with is not the most convenient to parse. It would be
-nice if we could get commit and signature information on a single line per
-commit. This can be accomplished with `--pretty`, but we have an additional
-problem---at the time of writing (in Git v1.7.10), the GPG `--pretty` options
-are undocumented.
-
-A quick look at
-https://github.com/gitster/git/blob/f9d995d5dd39c942c06829e45f195eeaa99936e1/pretty.c#L1038[
-+format_commit_one()+ in +pretty.c+] yields a +'G'+ placeholder that has three
-different formats:
-
-- *+%GG+*---GPG output (what we see in `git log --show-signature`)
-- *+%G?+*---Outputs "G" for a good
- signature and "B" for a bad signature; otherwise, an empty string
- (https://github.com/gitster/git/blob/f9d995d5dd39c942c06829e45f195eeaa99936e1/pretty.c#L808[see
- mapping in +signature_check+ struct])
-- *+%GS+*---The name of the signer
-
-We are interested in using the most concise and minimal representation ---
-+%G?+. Because this placeholder simply matches text on the GPG output, and the
-string +``gpg: Can't check signature: public key not found''+ is not mapped in
-+signature_check+, unknown signatures will output an empty string, not ``B''.
-This is not explicit behavior, so I'm unsure if this will change in future
-releases. Fortunately, we are only interested in ``G'', so this detail will not
-matter for our implementation.
-
-With this in mind, we can come up with some useful one-line output per commit.
-The below is based on the output resulting from the demonstration of
-xref:merge-3[merge option #3] above:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --pretty="format:%H %aN %s %G?"
-afb1e7373ae5e7dae3caab2c64cbb18db3d96fba Mike Gerwitz Modified bar G
-f227c90b116cc1d6770988a6ca359a8c92a83ce2 Mike Gerwitz Added bar G
-652f9aed906a646650c1e24914c94043ae99a407 John Doe Signed off G
-16ddd46b0c191b0e130d0d7d34c7fc7af03f2d3e John Doe Added feature X G
-cf43808e85399467885c444d2a37e609b7d9e99d Mike Gerwitz Test commit of foo G
-----
-
-Notice the ``G'' suffix for each of these lines, indicating that the signature
-is valid (which makes sense, since the signature is our own). Adding an
-additional commit, we can see what happens when a commit is unsigned:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ echo foo >> foo
-$ git commit -am 'Yet another foo'
-$ git log --pretty="format:%H %aN %s %G?" HEAD^..
-f72924356896ab95a542c495b796555d016cbddd Mike Gerwitz Yet another foo
-----
-
-Note that, as aforementioned, the string replacement of +%G?+ is empty when the
-commit is unsigned. However, what about commits that are signed but untrusted
-(not within our web of trust)?
-
-----
-$ gpg --edit-key 8EE30EAB
-[...]
-gpg> trust
-[...]
-Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
-(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
-
- 1 = I don't know or won't say
- 2 = I do NOT trust
- 3 = I trust marginally
- 4 = I trust fully
- 5 = I trust ultimately
- m = back to the main menu
-
-Your decision? 2
-[...]
-
-gpg> save
-Key not changed so no update needed.
-$ git log --pretty="format:%H %aN %s %G?" HEAD~2..
-f72924356896ab95a542c495b796555d016cbddd Mike Gerwitz Yet another foo
-afb1e7373ae5e7dae3caab2c64cbb18db3d96fba Mike Gerwitz Modified bar G
-----
-
-Uh oh. It seems that Git does not seem to check whether or not a signature is
-trusted. Let's take a look at the full GPG output:
-
-[[gpg-sig-untrusted]]
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --show-signature HEAD~2..HEAD^
-commit afb1e7373ae5e7dae3caab2c64cbb18db3d96fba
-gpg: Signature made Sun 22 Apr 2012 01:37:26 PM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
-gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
-Primary key fingerprint: 2217 5B02 E626 BC98 D7C0 C2E5 F22B B815 8EE3 0EAB
-Author: Mike Gerwitz <mike@mikegerwitz.com>
-Date: Sat Apr 21 17:35:27 2012 -0400
-
- Modified bar
-----
-
-As you can see, GPG provides a clear warning. Unfortunately,
-https://github.com/gitster/git/blob/f9d995d5dd39c942c06829e45f195eeaa99936e1/pretty.c#L808[
-+parse_signature_lines()+ in +pretty.c+], which references a simple mapping in
-+struct signature_check+, will blissfully ignore the warning and match only
-+``Good signature from''+, yielding ``G''. A patch to provide a separate token
-for untrusted keys is simple, but for the time being, we will explore two
-separate implementations---one that will parse the simple one-line output that
-is ignorant of trust and a mention of a less elegant implementation that parses
-the GPG output. footnote:[Should the patch be accepted, this article will be updated to
-use the new token.]
-
-
-[[script-notrust]]
-Signature Check Script, Disregarding Trust
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-As mentioned above, due to limitations of the current +%G?+ implementation, we
-cannot determine from the single-line output whether or not the given signature
-is actually trusted. This isn't necessarily a problem. Consider what will
-likely be a common use case for this script---to be run by a continuous
-integration (CI) system. In order to let the CI system know what signatures
-should be trusted, you will likely provide it with a set of keys for known
-committers, which eliminates the need for a web of trust (the act of placing the
-public key on the server indicates that you trust the key). Therefore, if the
-signature is recognized and is good, the commit can be trusted.
-
-One additional consideration is the need to ignore all ancestors of a given
-commit, which is necessary on older repositories where older commits will not be
-signed (see xref:commit-history[Commit History In a Nutshell] for information on
-why it is unnecessary, and probably a bad idea, to sign old commits). As such,
-our script will accept a ref and will only consider its children in the check.
-
-This script *assumes that each commit will be signed* and will output the SHA-1
-hash of each unsigned/bad commit, in addition to some additional, useful
-information, delimited by tabs.
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# Licensed under the CC0 1.0 Universal license (public domain).
-#
-# Validate signatures on each and every commit within the given range
-##
-
-# if a ref is provided, append range spec to include all children
-chkafter="${1+$1..}"
-
-# note: bash users may instead use $'\t'; the echo statement below is a more
-# portable option
-t=$( echo '\t' )
-
-# Check every commit after chkafter (or all commits if chkafter was not
-# provided) for a trusted signature, listing invalid commits. %G? will output
-# "G" if the signature is trusted.
-git log --pretty="format:%H$t%aN$t%s$t%G?" "${chkafter:-HEAD}" \
- | grep -v "${t}G$"
-
-# grep will exit with a non-zero status if no matches are found, which we
-# consider a success, so invert it
-[ $? -gt 0 ]
-----
-
-That's it; Git does most of the work for us! If a ref is provided, it will be
-converted into a http://book.git-scm.com/4_git_treeishes.html[range spec] by
-appending +``..''+ (e.g. +a1b2c+ becomes +a1b2c..+), which will cause `git log`
-to return all of its children (_not_ including the ref itself). If no ref is
-provided, we end up using +HEAD+ without a range spec, which will simply list
-every commit (using an empty string will cause Git to throw an error, and we
-must quote the string in case the user decides to do something like +``master@{5
-days ago}''+). Using the `--pretty` option to `git log`, we output the GPG
-signature result with +%G?+, in addition to some useful information we will want
-to see about any commits that do not pass the test. We can then filter out all
-commits that have been signed with a known key by removing all lines that end in
-``G''---the output from +%G?+ indicating a good signature.
-
-Let's see it in action (assuming the script has been saved as `signchk`):
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ chmod +x signchk
-$ ./signchk
-f72924356896ab95a542c495b796555d016cbddd Mike Gerwitz Yet another foo
-$ echo $?
-1
-----
-
-With no arguments, the script checks every commit in our repository, finding a
-single commit that has not been signed. At this point, we can either check the
-output itself or check the exit status of the script, which indicates a failure.
-If this script were run by a CI system, the best option would be to abort the
-build and immediately notify the maintainers of a potential security breach (or,
-more likely, someone simply forgot to sign their commit).
-
-If we check commits after that failure, assuming that each of the children have
-been signed, we will see the following:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ ./signchk f7292
-$ echo $?
-0
-----
-
-Be careful when running this script directly from the repository, especially
-with CI systems---you must either place a copy of the script outside of the
-repository or run the script from a trusted point in history. For example, if
-your CI system were to simply pull from the repository and then run the script,
-an attacker need only modify the script to circumvent this check entirely.
-
-
-[[script-trust]]
-Signature Check Script With Web Of Trust
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-The web of trust would come in handy for large groups of contributors; in such a
-case, your CI system could attempt to download the public key from a
-preconfigured keyserver when the key is encountered (updating the key if
-necessary to get trust signatures). Based on the web of trust established from
-the public keys directly trusted by the CI system, you could then automatically
-determine whether or not a commit can be trusted even if the key was not
-explicitly placed on the server.
-
-To accomplish this task, we will split the script up into two distinct
-portions---retrieving/updating all keys within the given range, followed by the
-actual signature verification. Let's start with the key gathering portion,
-which is actually a trivial task:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --show-signature \
- | grep 'key ID' \
- | grep -o '[A-Z0-9]\+$' \
- | sort \
- | uniq \
- | xargs gpg --keyserver key.server.org --recv-keys $keys
-----
-
-The above string of commands simply uses `grep` to pull the key ids out of `git
-log` output (using `--show-signature` to produce GPG output), and then requests
-only the unique keys from the given keyserver. In the case of the repository
-we've been using throughout this article, there is only a single signature---my
-own. In a larger repository, all unique keys will be listed. Note that the
-above example does not specify any range of commits; you are free to integrate
-it into the +signchk+ script to use the same range, but it isn't strictly
-necessary (it may provide a slight performance benefit, depending on the number
-of commits that would have been ignored).
-
-Armed with our updated keys, we can now verify the commits based on our web of
-trust. Whether or not a specific key will be trusted is
-http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN533[dependent on your personal
-settings]. The idea here is that you can trust a set of users (e.g. Linus'
-``lieutenants'') that in turn will trust other users which, depending on your
-configuration, may automatically be within your web of trust even if you do not
-personally trust them. This same concept can be applied to your CI server by
-placing its keyring in place of you own (or perhaps you will omit the CI server
-and run the script yourself).
-
-Unfortunately, with Git's current +%G?+ implementation, xref:automate[we are
-unable to check basic one-line output]. Instead, we must parse the output of
-`--show-signature` (xref:gpg-sig-untrusted[as shown above]) for each relevant
-commit. Combining our output with xref:script-notrust[the original script that
-disregards trust], we can arrive at the following, which is the output that we
-must parse:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --pretty="format:%H$t%aN$t%s$t%G?" --show-signature
-f72924356896ab95a542c495b796555d016cbddd Mike Gerwitz Yet another foo
-gpg: Signature made Sun 22 Apr 2012 01:37:26 PM EDT using RSA key ID 8EE30EAB
-gpg: Good signature from "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
-gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
-Primary key fingerprint: 2217 5B02 E626 BC98 D7C0 C2E5 F22B B815 8EE3 0EAB
-afb1e7373ae5e7dae3caab2c64cbb18db3d96fba Mike Gerwitz Modified bar G
-[...]
-----
-
-In the above snippet, it should be noted that the first commit (+f7292+) is
-_not_ signed, whereas the second (+afb1e+) is. Therefore, the GPG output
-_preceeds_ the commit line itself. Let's consider our objective:
-
-. List all unsigned commits, or commits with unknown or invalid signatures.
-. List all signed commits that are signed with known signatures, but are
- otherwise untrusted.
-
-Our xref:script-notrust[previous script] performs #1 just fine, so we need only
-augment it to support #2. In essence---we wish to convert lines ending in
-``G'' to something else if the GPG output _preceeding_ that line indicates that
-the signature is untrusted.
-
-There are many ways to go about doing this, but we will settle for a fairly
-clear set of commands that can be used to augment the previous script. To
-prevent the lines ending with ``G'' from being filtered from the output (should
-they be untrusted), we will suffix untrusted lines with ``U''. Consider the
-output of the following:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git log --pretty="format:^%H$t%aN$t%s$t%G?" --show-signature \
-> | grep '^\^\|gpg: .*not certified' \
-> | awk '
-> /^gpg:/ {
-> getline;
-> printf "%s U\n", $0;
-> next;
-> }
-> { print; }
-> ' \
-> | sed 's/^\^//'
-f72924356896ab95a542c495b796555d016cbddd Mike Gerwitz Yet another foo
-afb1e7373ae5e7dae3caab2c64cbb18db3d96fba Mike Gerwitz Modified bar G U
-f227c90b116cc1d6770988a6ca359a8c92a83ce2 Mike Gerwitz Added bar G U
-652f9aed906a646650c1e24914c94043ae99a407 John Doe Signed off G U
-16ddd46b0c191b0e130d0d7d34c7fc7af03f2d3e John Doe Added feature X G U
-cf43808e85399467885c444d2a37e609b7d9e99d Mike Gerwitz Test commit of foo G U
-----
-
-Here, we find that if we filter out those lines ending in ``G'' as we did
-before, we would be left with the untrusted commits in addition to the commits
-that are bad (``B'') or unsigned (blank), as indicated by +%G?+. To accomplish
-this, we first add the GPG output to the log with the `--show-signature` option
-and, to make filtering easier, prefix all commit lines with a caret (^) which
-we will later strip. We then filter all lines but those beginning with a caret,
-or lines that contain the string ``not certified'', which is part of the GPG
-output. This results in lines of commits with a single +``gpg:''+ line before
-them if they are untrusted. We can then pipe this to awk, which will remove all
-+``gpg:''+-prefixed lines and append +``U''+ to the next line (the commit line).
-Finally, we strip off the leading caret that was added during the beginning of
-this process to produce the final output.
-
-Please keep in mind that there is a huge difference between the conventional use
-of trust with PGP/GPG (``I assert that I know this person is who they claim they
-are'') vs trusting someone to commit to your repository. As such, it may be in
-your best interest to maintain an entirely separate web of trust for your CI
-server or whatever user is being used to perform the signature checks.
-
-
-[[script-merge]]
-Automating Merge Signature Checks
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The aforementioned scripts are excellent if you wish to check the validity of
-each individual commit, but not everyone will wish to put forth that amount of
-effort. Instead, maintainers may opt for a workflow that requires the signing
-of only the merge commit (xref:merge-2[option #2 above]), rather than each
-commit that is introduced by the merge. Let us consider the appropach we would
-have to take for such an implementation:
-
-=========================================================================
-Given reference commit +r+ (optionally empty), let
-+C'+ be the set of all _first-parent_ commits such that +C'+ = +r..HEAD+
-(http://book.git-scm.com/4_git_treeishes.html[range spec]) and let
-+K+ be the set of all public keys in a given GPG keyring. We must assert
-that, for each commit +c+ in +C'+, there must exist a key
-+k+ in keyring +K+ such that +k+ is
-https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust[trusted] and can be used to
-verify the signature of +c+. This assertion is denoted by the function `\(g\)`
-(GPG) in the following expression: `\(\forall{c}{\in}\mathbf{C'}\, g(c)\)`.
-=========================================================================
-
-The only difference between this script and the script that checks for a
-signature on each individual commit is that *this script will only check for
-commits on a particular branch* (e.g. +master+). This is important---if we
-commit directly onto master, we want to ensure that the commit is signed (since
-there will be no merge). If we merge _into_ master, a merge commit will be
-created, which we may sign and ignore all commits introduced by the merge. If
-the merge is a fast-forward, a merge commit can be forcefully created with the
-`--no-ff` option to avoid the need to amend each commit with a signature.
-
-To demonstrate a script that can valdiate commits for this type of workflow,
-let's first create some changes that would result in a merge:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git checkout -b diverge
-$ echo foo > diverged
-$ git add diverged
-$ git commit -m 'Added content to diverged'
-[diverge cfe7389] Added content to diverged
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
- create mode 100644 diverged
-$ echo foo2 >> diverged
-$ git commit -am 'Added additional content to diverged'
-[diverge 996cf32] Added additional content to diverged
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-$ git checkout master
-Switched to branch 'master'
-$ echo foo >> foo
-$ git commit -S -am 'Added data to master'
-
-You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
-user: "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-4096-bit RSA key, ID 8EE30EAB, created 2011-06-16
-
-[master 3cbc6d2] Added data to master
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-$ git merge -S diverge
-
-You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
-user: "Mike Gerwitz (Free Software Developer) <mike@mikegerwitz.com>"
-4096-bit RSA key, ID 8EE30EAB, created 2011-06-16
-
-Merge made by the 'recursive' strategy.
- diverged | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 diverged
-----
-
-Above, committed in both +master+ and a new +diverge+ branch in order to ensure
-that the merge would not be a fast-forward (alternatively, we could have used
-the `--no-ff` option of `git merge`). This results in the following (your hashes
-will vary):
-
-----
-$ git log --oneline --graph
-* 9307dc5 Merge branch 'diverge'
-|\
-| * 996cf32 Added additional content to diverged
-| * cfe7389 Added content to diverged
-* | 3cbc6d2 Added data to master
-|/
-* f729243 Yet another foo
-* afb1e73 Modified bar
-* f227c90 Added bar
-* 652f9ae Signed off
-* 16ddd46 Added feature X
-* cf43808 Test commit of foo
-----
-
-From the above graph, we can see that we are interested in signatures on only
-two of the commits: +3cbc6d2+, which was created directly on +master+, and
-+9307dc5+---the merge commit. The other two commits (+996cf32+ and +cfe7389+)
-need not be signed because the signing of the merge commit asserts their
-validity (assuming that the author of the merge was vigilant). But how do we
-ignore those commits?
-
-----
-$ git log --oneline --graph --first-parent
-* 9307dc5 Merge branch 'diverge'
-* 3cbc6d2 Added data to master
-* f729243 Yet another foo
-* afb1e73 Modified bar
-* f227c90 Added bar
-* 652f9ae Signed off
-* 16ddd46 Added feature X
-* cf43808 Test commit of foo
-----
-
-The above example simply added the `--first-parent` option to `git log`, which
-will display only the first parent commit when encountering a merge commit.
-Importantly, this means that we are left with _only the commits on_ +master+ (or
-whatever branch you decide to reference). These are the commits we wish to
-validate.
-
-Performing the validation is therefore only a slight modification to the
-original script:
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# Validate signatures on only direct commits and merge commits for a particular
-# branch (current branch)
-##
-
-# if a ref is provided, append range spec to include all children
-chkafter="${1+$1..}"
-
-# note: bash users may instead use $'\t'; the echo statement below is a more
-# portable option (-e is unsupported with /bin/sh)
-t=$( echo '\t' )
-
-# Check every commit after chkafter (or all commits if chkafter was not
-# provided) for a trusted signature, listing invalid commits. %G? will output
-# "G" if the signature is trusted.
-git log --pretty="format:%H$t%aN$t%s$t%G?" "${chkafter:-HEAD}" --first-parent \
- | grep -v "${t}G$"
-
-# grep will exit with a non-zero status if no matches are found, which we
-# consider a success, so invert it
-[ $? -gt 0 ]
-----
-
-If you run the above script using the branch setup provided above, then you will
-find that neither of the commits made in the +diverge+ branch are listed in the
-output. Since the merge commit itself is signed, it is also omitted from the
-output (leaving us with only the unsigned commit mentioned in the previous
-sections). To demonstrate what will happen if the merge commit is _not_ signed,
-we can amend it as follows (omitting the `-S` option):
-
-[source,shell]
-----
-$ git commit --amend
-[master 9ee66e9] Merge branch 'diverge'
-$ ./signchk
-9ee66e900265d82f5389e403a894e8d06830e463 Mike Gerwitz Merge branch 'diverge'
-f72924356896ab95a542c495b796555d016cbddd Mike Gerwitz Yet another foo
-$ echo $?
-1
-----
-
-The merge commit is then listed, requiring a valid signature. footnote:[If you wish to
-ensure that this signature is trusted as well, see xref:script-trust[the section
-on verifying commits within a web of trust].]
-
-
-Summary
--------
-* xref:trust[Be careful of who you trust.] Is your repository safe from
- harm/exploitation on your PC? What about the PCs of those whom you trust?
-** xref:trust-host[Your host is not necessarily secure.] Be wary of using
- remotely hosted repositories as your primary hub.
-* xref:trust-ensure[Using GPG to sign your commits] can help to assert your
- identity, helping to protect your reputation from impostors.
-* For large merges, you must develop a security practice that works best for
- your particular project. Specifically, you may choose to xref:merge-3[sign
- each individual commit] introduced by the merge, xref:merge-2[sign only the
- merge commit], or xref:merge-1[squash all commits] and sign the resulting
- commit.
-* If you have an existing repository, there is xref:commit-history[little need
- to go rewriting history to mass-sign commits].
-* Once you have determined the security policy best for your project, you may
- xref:automate[automate signature verification] to ensure that no unauthorized
- commits sneak into your repository.
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/10_c9a9837 b/docs/papers/thoughts/10_c9a9837
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/10_c9a9837
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/15_36504cb b/docs/papers/thoughts/15_36504cb
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/15_36504cb
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/20_1ec8b20 b/docs/papers/thoughts/20_1ec8b20
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/20_1ec8b20
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/30_288c90d b/docs/papers/thoughts/30_288c90d
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/30_288c90d
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/40_2ae3e94 b/docs/papers/thoughts/40_2ae3e94
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/40_2ae3e94
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/50_3c37140 b/docs/papers/thoughts/50_3c37140
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/50_3c37140
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/docs/papers/thoughts/60_3fa69da b/docs/papers/thoughts/60_3fa69da
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
--- a/docs/papers/thoughts/60_3fa69da
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/tpl/.config b/tpl/.config
deleted file mode 100644
index d67f5d1..0000000
--- a/tpl/.config
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Basic template configuration; command-line options will override
-#
-# Copyright (C) 2013, 2015, 2016 Mike Gerwitz
-#
-# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-# (at your option) any later version.
-#
-# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
-# GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-# #
-
-get-menu-docs()
-{
- # we shall only consider ordered pages---that is, those that begin with numbers; this
- # allows pages to exist that are not listed in the menu
- paths=$(
- find "$path_root/docs" -maxdepth 1 -name '[0-9][0-9]-*.??' \
- -exec basename {} \; \
- | sort
- )
-
- for p in $paths; do
- # we shall consider the name of the link to be the path with the extension
- # and sorting prefix stripped
- name="$( basename "${p%%.*}" )"
- echo "${name#??-}"
- done
-}
-
-html_external_css=/style.css
-
-# lets certain browsers---such as the proprietary mobile Safari browser that
-# seems to be far too Ubiquitous---know that they should trust us with rendering
-# the page to fit within the device's screen resolution
-html_head='<meta name="viewport" content="initial-scale=1.0" />'
-
-# menu just below the header, above the index
-html_pre_index="$(
-
- echo '<ul id="menu">'
-
- # generate menu from the root documents
- for name in `get-menu-docs`; do
- # each word in the name will be capitalized and the link shall not contain
- # the file extension
- words=( ${name//[_-]/ } )
- printf '<li><a href="/%s">%s</a></li>' "$name" "${words[*]^}"
- done
- echo '<li><a href="//social.mikegerwitz.com/"' \
- 'title="My GNU Social Instance">Social</a></li>'
-
- # the remainder will appear below the menu, above the index
-cat <<EOH
- </ul>
- <div id="headline">
- <a href="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">
- <img src="/images/eff-nsa-spying.png"
- alt="NSA Spying on Americans"
- title="NSA Spying on Americans" />
- </a>
-
- <a href="http://upgradefromwindows8.com">
- <img src="/images/win8-close.png"
- alt="Close Windows, Open Doors" />
- </a>
- </div>
-EOH
-)"
-
-
-# additional content in the footer before the copyright (the awkward newline
-# positions are to prevent spaces in the output)
-html_footer=$(cat <<EOM
- <a href="/about/inside" id="gnuinside">
- <img src="/images/gnu-inside.png" alt="GNU/Linux Inside!" />
- </a>
-
- <div class="bimgs">
- <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"
- ><img src="/images/cc-bysa-88x31.png"
- alt="[CC BY-SA]"
- title="Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike"
- width="88" height="31" border="0"
- /></a>
-
- <a href="http://www.fsf.org/register_form?referrer=5804"
- ><img src="/images/fsf-member.png"
- alt="[FSF Associate Member since 2007-10-31]"
- title="FSF Associate Member"
- width="125" height="31" border="0"
- /></a>
-
- <a href="http://www.defectivebydesign.org/join/button"
- ><img src="/images/elim-drm.gif"
- alt="[ Eliminate DRM! ]"
- title="Eliminate DRM!"
- width="88" height="30" border="0"
- /></a>
- </div>
-EOM
-)
-
-
-# index-only footer (we don't want too much spam; the other pages look much
-# cleaner without this)
-html_index_footer=$(cat <<EOM
- <div id="selflinks">
- <a href="https://gitlab.com/u/mikegerwitz">
- <img src="/images/gitlab.svg"
- alt="mikegerwitz on GitLab"
- title="mikegerwitz on GitLab"
- width="42" height="42" border="0"
- />
- </a>
-
- <a href="/about/githubbub">
- <img src="/images/octoright-42.png"
- alt="Don't see me on GitHub"
- title="Don't see me on GitHub"
- width="42" height="42" border="0"
- />
- </a>
-
- <a href="https://savannah.gnu.org/users/mikegerwitz">
- <img src="/images/meditate-42.png"
- alt="See me on Savannah"
- title="See me on Savannah"
- width="42" height="42" border="0"
- />
- </a>
-
- <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=mikegerwitz"
- title="mikegerwitz on Hacker News"
- class="hn-icon">HN</a>
-
- <a href="https://www.fsf.org/register_form?referrer=5804">
- <img src="/images/fsf-42.png"
- alt="FSF Member #5804"
- title="FSF Member #5804"
- width="42" height="42" border="0"
- />
- </a>
-
- <a href="https://www.eff.org/">
- <img src="/images/eff-42.png"
- alt="EFF Member"
- title="EFF Member"
- width="42" height="42" border="0"
- />
- </a>
- </div>
-EOM
-)
diff --git a/tpl/content b/tpl/content
deleted file mode 100755
index abc1546..0000000
--- a/tpl/content
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# General content template
-#
-# Copyright (C) 2013 Mike Gerwitz
-#
-# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-# (at your option) any later version.
-#
-# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
-# GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-# #
-
-# for the time being, content pages are simply styled with the index page
-export html_body_class='index content'
-resume-default index